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Summary
In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which is an
arid country, the per capita availability of water is
low and declining. Moreover, in the Lower Jordan
River basin the annual water withdrawal stands at
585 million m3 (Mm3), roughly half of which is
pumped from aquifers. The development of both
public irrigation systems in the ‘Jordan Rift
Valley’ and private groundwater abstraction in the
‘Highlands’ has committed most of the surface
water and groundwater, respectively. With the
growth of urban demand and the evidence of
serious overdraft of aquifers, many policy
instruments have been used in the last 10 years
to reallocate water to nonagricultural uses;
encourage improvements in efficiency throughout
the water sector; use increasing volumes of
treated wastewater for agricultural purposes and
curb groundwater abstraction.
Emphasis has been placed on demand
management—a plan to reform the agriculture
sector (ASAL 1994) and a new national water
strategy (1997) have vested much hope in
economic instruments and reforms. Pricing of
irrigation water at adequate levels was seen as a
crucial lever to elicit water savings, raise water
productivity, ensure financial sustainability, and
allocate water economically. In 2002, the
‘Groundwater Control Bylaw No. (85)’ was
passed with the objective of controlling
groundwater abstraction in the Highlands by
taxing abstraction above a limit of 150,000 m3/
well/yr. In the Jordan Valley, a block-rate tariff
system associated with crop-based quotas had
been in place for some time and the debate
revolved on the possibility of increasing water
charges to cover costs and promote
water-saving behaviors among the water users.
This report examines both contexts, the
Highlands and the Jordan Valley, and establishes
farming system typologies that illustrate the
diversity of farms and farmers. Their respective
strategies in the face of rising prices are
assessed based on crop budgets and farm
constraints and strategies. Options include
reducing cropping areas, shifting cropping
patterns, improving irrigation efficiency, renting
wells or plots to other farmers, discontinuing
agriculture or just paying the relevant charges.
By using regional farm and crop data, these
strategies are aggregated to describe the
likelihood of success of water pricing policies in
terms of recovering operation and maintenance
(O&M) costs, saving water and improving
economic efficiency. Finally, this study explores
some of the alternatives available for meeting
these objectives.
The analysis shows that increased charges
alone are unlikely to bring about significant water
savings and that, beyond certain levels, they will
reinforce dynamics towards more capital-intensive
farming in both the Highlands and the Jordan
Valley. Water productivity could be increased but
this would take place to the detriment of poorer
and more extensive farmers and would transfer a
growing share of the value added to major
entrepreneurs and state agencies. In addition, in
the Highlands, it might eventually increase the
amount of water depleted. Hence, farmers should
not be made to bear price incentives unless
these are accompanied with positive incentives
that reduce capital and risk constraints, offer
attractive cropping alternatives, and exit options
with appropriate compensation.
In the Highlands, water abstraction cannot be
brought to sustainable levels merely through price
revisions. Nevertheless, it can be done through
the implementation of drastic measures such as
setting a maximum limit on annual well
abstraction (fixed quota), offering subsidies to
encourage the buy-out of wells, and uprooting of
olive trees.
In the Jordan Valley, recovery of operation
and maintenance (O&M) costs of the public
irrigation system is desirable and achievable
without imposing too much of a burden on
farmers. Higher prices, however, have limitedvi
potential for achieving gains in irrigation
efficiency. The current system of quotas (strict
limitations when demand exceeds supply), the
lack of storage and the technical difficulties
experienced in the collective and individual
pressurized networks indicate that little water can
be saved. The new dam on the Yarmouk River,
however, could allow monthly quotas to be
transformed into a yearly quota, with the
possibility of fine-tuning supply and saving water
in the excess periods. In the Jordan Valley,
on-farm losses are not merely the result of low
water prices but reflect the high costs of adopting
better technology without subsidies and
intensifying production. Capital-intensive farmers
have shifted to high-quality products for specific
market niches, despite low water prices, but such
strategies remain out of the reach of small and
frequently indebted farmers. Savings could be
obtained through reconsideration of higher quotas
granted to citrus and banana farms, and being
more flexible by allowing trading of water rights.
This latter option, however, might lead to a
concentration of rights in the hands of major
entrepreneurs, an evolution that is currently seen
as undesirable by the decision makers.1
Irrigated Agriculture, Water Pricing and Water
Savings in the Lower Jordan River Basin (in Jordan)
Jean-Philippe Venot, François Molle and Yousef Hassan
scheme supplies approximately 23,000 hectares,
and the Highlands, which includes two
groundwater basins of major importance, the
Amman-Zarqa (AZB) and the Yarmouk
1 (figure 1),
where most of the private tube-well-based
irrigation (that has developed over 14,000
hectares over the last 30 years) takes place.
This report focuses on the debate revolving
around the pricing of water as a means to regulate
water use in irrigation, in these two contrasting
environments. In both the Highlands and the
Jordan Valley, a typology of farming systems has
been established to discriminate the impact of
pricing policies on different types of farms, and to
assess what could be farmers’ adjustments and
responses in each case. Regional data aggregation
then provides a wider picture of the water savings
achieved, and of the financial impacts on both the
farmers and the state.
The first section (The Policy Context)
presents the water policy context of Jordan, in
which different pricing policies have been recently
implemented. The following section (The Farming
Sytems in the Two Study Areas) sets the context
of the study and describes the LJRB and the
irrigated farming systems of the two regions.
Section 3 (Pricing Water to Control Groundwater
Overabstraction in the Highlands) and section 4
(Water Pricing in the Jordan Valley) investigate
the efficiency of pricing water in reducing
groundwater abstraction in the Jordanian
Highlands, and in reducing agricultural freshwater
Introduction
One of the countries with the scarcest water
resources in the world is the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan. Due to both physical water scarcity
and a high demographic growth during most of
the second half of the twentieth century it has
been estimated that the per capita endowment of
renewable blue water (i.e., surface runoff and
groundwater recharge) is now only 163 m
3/yr,
while the average domestic consumption is 94
liters per capita and per day nationwide (THKJ
2004). The water resources available in the
Jordanian part of the Lower Jordan River Basin
(LJRB: see figure 1) are currently being renewed
at a rate of 705 million cubic meters per year
(Mm
3/yr), including 155 Mm
3/yr of groundwater
and 550 Mm
3/yr of surface water. The total water
withdrawn within the basin amounts to 585 Mm
3/
yr, i.e., 83 percent of the renewable surface water
and groundwater, but this value obscures the
critical overdraft of the main aquifers (Courcier et
al. 2005).
The LJRB is a region of prime importance for
the country: it includes 83 percent of the total
population, most of the main industries, and 80
percent of irrigated agriculture of the country; it is
endowed with 80 percent of the country’s water
resources and uses 75 percent of these (Venot
2004b). With the exception of some rain-fed
agriculture in the mountain range (pasture, wheat,
olive trees etc.), the bulk of agriculture is irrigated
and can be found in two contrasting
environments—the Jordan Valley, where a public
1 The Amman-Zarqa and Yarmouk groundwater basins are roughly coterminous with the river basins bearing the same names.2
diversion in the Jordan Valley, respectively.
Section 5 (Discussion and Prospects) expands
the discussion to the wider socio-political and
economic context, in which water policies, in
general, and pricing policy, in particular, are
embedded—it discusses the disjuncture between
expected and actual or estimated outcomes,
points to commonalities and discrepancies
between the two regions, and identifies measures
that can improve water management in Jordan.
Finally, the last section (Conclusion) provides
conclusions made by the study.
FIGURE 1.
Main water uses; water flows and agricultural zoning in the Lower Jordan River Basin.
Note: The land-use classification is from the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) and the GTZ3
The Policy Context: Debating Allocation and Pricing of Water
in Jordan
absence of controls on licensed abstraction rates”
(THKJ and MWI 1997b, 1998a). High rates of
abstraction (up to 215% of the mean annual
recharge in the AZB) prompted the government to
react by designing a new water strategy in 1997
(THKJ and MWI 1997b). Pricing policies were
deemed to assist in controlling groundwater
abstraction with the ambitious task of taking
abstraction rates “close to the annual recharge by
the year 2005”
2 and to elicit shifts towards higher-
value crops. The Groundwater Control Bylaw
No.85, passed in 2002 and further amended in
2004, was designed to regulate groundwater
abstraction through the establishment of a quota of
150,000 m
3/yr/well and a block-rate tariff system to
be operative beyond the quota.
In the Jordan Valley, a block-rate tariff
system associated with crop-based quotas had
been in place for some time and the debate
revolved on the possibility of increasing water
charges—more expensive water was expected to
bring about efficiency improvements and a switch
to less water-intensive crops, thus making water
available for Amman (World Bank 2003b). The
block-rate tariff system would also assist in
recovering state expenditures in public irrigation
schemes: “The water price shall at least cover
the cost of operation and maintenance (O&M)
and, subject to some other economic constraints,
it should also recover part of the capital cost of
the irrigation water project. The ultimate objective
being the full recovery of cost subject to
economic, social and political constraints” (THKJ
and MWI 1997a, 1998b, 2004c and JRVIP 2001).
Some of these reforms were to be embedded
in the 1994 Agriculture Sector Structural
Adjustment Loan (ASAL) jointly funded by the
World Bank and the German KfW and designed
with the prime objective of “supporting a transition
to an optimal use of water and land resources” and
addressing key problems in the sector: “the lack of
The main water use areas, water flows and water
allocation problems in the LJRB are schematized
in figure 1. Amman receives water from the
Jordan Valley, local aquifers, and from the
southern and eastern outer basins. To meet the
increasing domestic water demand, available
options include:  a) improving inflow from the
Yarmouk River (with the newly built Wehdah Dam
[Al-Jayyousi 2001]); b) transferring more water
from the Jordan Valley to Amman (and hence
reducing freshwater supply to agriculture, although
treated wastewater [TWW] is sent back to the
Jordan Valley); c) reducing abstraction from
aquifers by highland agriculture in order to
preserve water quality, avoid overdraft and
reallocate water to cities (ARD and USAID 2001a;
Chebaane et al. 2004); and d) relying on (costly)
imports (THKJ 2004).
In the early 1990s, Jordan’s officials evaluated
the coming water crisis and began shifting their
policy focus from supply augmentation towards
demand management (Al-Jayyousi 2001). The
World Bank and other development agencies
emphasized the unsustainable use of water and
were influential in calling for an agenda that would
include demand-management instruments to
encourage efficient water use, transfer water to
nonagricultural higher-value uses (agriculture only
generated 3.6 percent of the country’s GDP in
2005 [Central Bank of Jordan 2005]), and reduce
groundwater overdraft (Pitman 2004). The
expectations were high and it was anticipated that
this policy shift would reconcile the different goals
central to the definition of ‘Integrated Water
Resources Management’ e.g., economic efficiency,
equity and environmental sustainability. Pricing of
irrigation water was chosen as an instrument to
reduce the demand for water (World Bank 2003a).
In the Highlands, the development of
groundwater resources had been “exacerbated by
relaxed controls on drilling operations, and the near
2 This target was revised in 2004 and shifted to 2020 (Pitman 2004).4
a national water policy, competing sector
institutions, and insufficient attention to demand
management” (ASAL-JORDAN 1994; Berkoff 1994
and World Bank 2003a). The implementation of
these policies proved to be problematic: according
to Pitman (2004), Jordan had not asked for such
lending and there was much doubt within the bank
on the potential efficiency of pricing policies for
allocating water, as well as conflicting views on the
social and political impacts of the market-based
measures that were being discussed. Pitman
(2004) reports that “the Government was upset by
the Bank’s unwillingness to take account of the
political realities of water and the difficulties
increased agricultural water tariffs would cause”
and argued that administrative allocation coupled
with efficiency improvement would be more
effective in saving water. These policies, whether
embedded in the ASAL or in the 1997 Water
Strategy, generated a substantial debate as shown
by the occupation of Parliament in opposition to
higher water tariffs, requiring further intervention by
His Majesty the King (Pitman, 2004).
Jordan provides an interesting case where two
different types of irrigation have developed: one
controlled by the state (public management of a
pressurized irrigation system in the Jordan Valley)
and the other developed privately (albeit initially
with state support: tube-well-irrigation in the
Highlands). Because of the necessity for
intersectoral reallocation, state policies and
regulation are needed to effectively reduce the
water use. This report examines the rationale,
the potential and the current impact of two
water-pricing policies. It attempts to answer the
following questions:
• What will be the likely impacts of the
application of the bylaw in the Highlands?
• What will be the financial impact of increasing
water prices in the Jordan Valley, to cover
O&M or capital costs?
• What is the likelihood of success of such
policies in terms of water saving and raising
economic efficiency, and what alternatives
are available to meet these objectives?
Farming Systems in the Two Study Areas
The LJRB represents 40 percent of the entire
Jordan River Basin, but only 7.8 percent of
Jordan’s total territory (figure 1). The basin thus
defined is nevertheless the wettest area in Jordan
and is endowed with 80 percent of the country’s
water resources. Figure 2 shows a cross section
of the LJRB from west (the Jordan River) to east
(the eastern desert area). The LJRB is divided
into two main areas: the Jordan Valley and the
remaining part referred to by the term ‘Highlands’.
The Highlands are composed of a mountain
range (uplands) running alongside the Jordan
Valley and of a desert plateau (Badia) extending
easterly to Syria and Iraq. The mountains are
mostly composed of rangelands, with occasional
olive trees and stone-fruit trees. The plateau has
an average altitude of 600 m and is mainly used
Physical Features of the Lower Jordan
River Basin (LJRB)
The Jordan River is an international river, which
flows through a total area of about 18,000 km²
pertaining to five countries namely, Jordan, Syria,
Lebanon, Israel and Palestine (the West Bank).
Its three headwater tributaries originate from the
slopes of Mount Hermon (Lebanon) and flow
southward into Lake Tiberias. With the outflow of
the Jordan River from Lake Tiberias blocked by
Israel, the Lower Jordan River receives the water
chiefly from its main tributary, the Yarmouk River.
Several temporary streams of lesser importance
named ‘side-wadis’, as well as the larger Zarqa
River, also incise the two mountainous banks and
feed the Lower Jordan River.5
to grow cereals near the mountains, where main
urban areas are concentrated and the rainfall is
still sufficient for rain-fed agriculture. Eastward,
precipitations become scarcer and only nomadic
Bedouin livestock farming can be found, with a
few localized plots of groundwater-based irrigated
agriculture.
The Jordan Valley is a 110-km stretch
between the Yarmouk River in the north and the
Dead Sea in the south; it is the northern part of
the Jordan Rift Valley, extending from Lake
Tiberias in the north to the Red Sea in the south.
Its altitude varies from 200 m (in the north) to
400 m (in the south) below sea level. The climate
is semi-arid in the north and arid in the south.
The Jordan River flows in a 30–60 m deep gorge
through a narrow alluvial, fertile plain that is
locally called Al Zhor (figure 2), which can be
flooded during exceptional hydrologic events, as
occurred in 2003. The rest of the valley, called Al
Ghor, is a fertile area where irrigation schemes
have been built.
This report focuses on two main regions of
the LJRB: a) the eastern desert area, which is
the only region of the LJRB Highlands that will be
affected by the bylaw;
3 and b) the Jordan Valley.
The eastern desert overlaps the Amman-Zarqa
and the Yarmouk groundwater basins (figure 1).
These basins represent 57 and 20 percent of the
LJRB area, respectively, and include 38 percent
of all irrigated areas in the LJRB.
History of Agricultural Development in
the Highlands and in the Jordan Valley
Over the years, irrigation in the Jordan Valley has
developed along the side-wadi valleys and on
their alluvial fans, and wherever springs were
available (Khouri 1981). Large-scale public
irrigation dates back to the establishment of the
Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) and to the
construction, between 1958 and 1966, of a main
69-km concrete canal—the King Abdullah Canal
(KAC)—which parallels the Jordan River on its
eastern bank. In 1962, a land reform led to the
formation of thousands of small intensive farms
(3.5 ha on average), and the settlement of
numerous families, including Palestinian refugees
(Khouri 1981; Van Aken 2004). During the same
3 Some located in the south of the Jordan Valley which are using groundwater, as well as farmers located in the surroundings of the
Azraq oasis (in the east of the country) and in the plateaus south of Amman will be affected by the bylaw (Venot 2004a). They,
however, are not considered in the present study.
FIGURE 2.
Cross section (west-east) of the Lower Jordan River Basin.
Source: Courcier et al. 20056
period, several governmental projects aiming at
settling Bedouins were implemented in the
Highlands (and notably in the eastern desert
area). Land was irrigated by the public, while
deep wells were managed by the Water Authority
of Jordan (WAJ). Although these projects focused
on subsistence and fodder crops, and seemed to
have failed in most cases, many Bedouins
adopted the idea and began to drill their own
wells and engage in private irrigation, often
keeping part of their herd too. This was the origin
of a modern market-oriented agriculture developed
by small to medium entrepreneurial farmers,
supplying growing cities and exporting their
surplus produce around the Middle East (Elmusa
1994; Nachbaur 2004; Venot 2004a).
Irrigated agriculture thrived in the late 1970s
and 1980s. In the Jordan Valley, irrigation facilities
were improved and expanded by the government,
and modern irrigation and cropping techniques
(greenhouses, drip irrigation, plastic mulch, fertilizer,
new varieties, etc.), together with cheap labor from
Egypt, became widely available. In the Highlands,
energy costs decreased, well-drilling techniques
improved, and land was cheap, fertile and immune
to diseases. During this period, agricultural revenues
increased tenfold for vegetables and more than
doubled for fruits: irrigated agriculture in Jordan
enjoyed a boom in production and economic
profitability, which was described by Elmusa (1994)
as the “Super Green Revolution.”
With increasing economic competition from
the surrounding countries (Turkey, Lebanon and
Syria) and the loss of the Gulf export market (due
to both fears of the impact of the use of
wastewater in vegetable production and the first
Gulf war) in the 1990s, the profitability of
Jordanian agriculture decreased, strongly affecting
farm revenues (GTZ 1995; Fitch 2001; Jabarin
2001). The sector’s contribution to Jordan’s Gross
Domestic Product declined from 8.1 percent in
1991 to 3.6 percent in 2005 (Nachbaur 2004 and
Central Bank of Jordan 2005). Competition for
water also increased. Freshwater has been
increasingly transferred from irrigated agriculture
(in the Jordan Valley) to urban uses (in the
Highlands)—(figure 1 and Courcier et al. 2005),
affecting the agriculture sector, which receives
ever-decreasing quantities of water and becomes
more vulnerable to droughts. In exchange,
agriculture in the southern part of the Jordan
Valley is increasingly supplied with treated
wastewater blended with freshwater coming from
the Zarqa River (see McCornick et al. 2001,
2002; THKJ et al. 2002; Scott et al. 2003; THKJ
and MWI 2004b; JICA 2004).
Farming System Characterization
Methodology
Farming systems were analyzed in order to
identify the different types of farms found in the
Jordan Valley and in the Highlands.
Understanding the socioeconomic processes
occurring at this micro-scale will facilitate us to
better foresee the adjustments and the strategies
developed by farmers in a changing context, and
to assess the impact of water-pricing policies on
farmers. By complementing this micro-level
analysis with regional data (statistic data, satellite
image analysis, etc.), we can assess the
possible evolution of regional irrigated agriculture
as a whole.
Extensive farm surveys were carried out in
the Highlands by ARD/USAID in 2000/2001 (ARD
and USAID 2001a; Fitch 2001; Chebaane et al.
2004), but economic analyses were mainly based
on cropping patterns. This makes it difficult to
discriminate responses by type of farmer. In order
to sketch out farming systems that combine
typical cropping patterns with socioeconomic
characterization (profile of the farmer, land tenure,
labor use, costs, etc.), 30 farm surveys were
carried out during the spring of 2003. Farming
systems were then modeled in economic terms
based on crop budgets, the consistencies of
which were checked with ARD/USAID data.
Likewise, the main farming systems in the Jordan
Valley were identified and their economics were
modeled on 50 farm surveys carried out during
the spring of 2003, the consistencies of which
were checked against other studies
(Salman 2001b; ARD and USAID 2001c).7
Farming Systems in the Highlands
This section focuses on the eastern desert
region, which totals an irrigated area of 11,835
ha; 50 percent of which is planted with olive
trees, 34 percent with stone-fruit trees (peach
and nectarine trees essentially) and 16 percent
with vegetables (see appendix 3). The Highland
surveys led to the identification of three main
categories of farming systems (see table 1; a
detailed description can be found in appendix 1).
They include settled Bedouins who have taken
up vegetable (and sometimes fruit-tree)
cultivation, and urban-based entrepreneurs
involved in high-value fruit production and
closely managing their farm, although they often
reside in Amman. Both Bedouins and
entrepreneurs, at times, also maintain olive
orchards. Other absentee-owners adopt more
extensive agricultural systems (with open-field
vegetables or olive trees) and employ a
manager. The main differences between these
farming systems are the degree of capital use
and intensification, the type of land tenure and
the direct/indirect type of management. All farms
are equipped with a pressurized irrigation
network and crops are watered by drippers.
Farming Systems in the Jordan Valley
We focus here on the northern and middle
directorates of the Jordan Valley where JVA’s
allocation rules apply. The irrigated area is 19,345
hectares, with 43 percent of the area for
vegetables (both in open field and under
greenhouses), 42 percent for citrus, and the
remaining area for banana and cereals
(cf. appendix 3). A conversion from the earlier
open channel irrigation network to pressurized
systems was completed in the mid-1990s.
Irrigation water is now provided to farmers through
pumping stations that draw water directly from the
King Abdullah Canal and supply collective
pressurized networks that serve areas of
approximately 400 to 500 ha.
Just like in the Highlands, farming systems
in the Jordan Valley are very diverse. Generally,
farming systems in the Jordan Valley are more
intensive than in the Highlands: farms are
smaller (3.5 ha on average against 20–25 ha in
the Highlands) and net benefit per hectare (for
similar crops and/or farming systems) is higher.
The Jordan Valley survey identified five main
categories of farming systems (see table 2 and
appendix 1 for more details). They include:
TABLE 1.
Profile of main farming systems (eastern desert region; LJRB Highlands).*
Settled Bedouins Stone-fruit tree entrepreneurs Absentee-owners
Family Mixed farm-  Family fruit- Intensive Intensive Prestige Extensive
vegetable vegetables tree farms entrepreneurial absentee- olive tree open-field
farm and olive farmer owner—stone- farm vegetables
trees fruit  trees
and olive trees
Land tenure/water Rent Ownership Ownership Ownership Ownership Ownership Ownership/Rent
access
Farm area range 20–25 ‘20–25’+‘10–15' 10–20 25–35 40–80 15–35 20–25
(ha)
Net revenue 1,100 621 6,900 16,000 14,850 300 600
(US$/ha/yr)**
Net revenue 24,750 21,750 103,500 480,000 891,000 7,500 13,500
(US$/farm/yr)
Number of wells 1111 2 1 1
Notes: * The data represent mean values obtained during a survey of 30 farmers in the eastern desert of the LJRB Highlands during 2003
** The net revenue is the gross income minus all production costs (the latter includes amortization of capital, financial costs, and
hired labor valued on the basis of daily wages observed in the Highlands)8
1) family farmers, who either own or rent the
land and grow vegetables in open fields;
2) entrepreneurial farmers, who adopt
capital- and labor-intensive techniques such as
greenhouses, and earn high return on
investments; 3) citrus orchards in the north of
the Jordan Valley, managed either by the family
who owns the land or by absentee-investors
interested in the social rather than the
economical value of their farm; 4) highly
profitable bananas grown in the extreme north
of the Jordan Valley; and 5) mixed farms with
more extensive vegetable cultivation,
associated with small orchards (the poorest
category of farmers). The same features
mentioned above, for the Highlands,
differentiate farming systems in the Jordan
Valley. In addition, irrigation technology is also
very important to characterize each farming
system in the Jordan Valley as it determines the
different strategies that farmers may develop to
adjust to an increase in water prices.
TABLE 2.
Profile of the main farming systems (Jordan Valley, northern and middle directorates).*
Citrus farms Banana farms Mixed farms
Open-field Entrepreneurial Family Absentee- Family Entrepreneurial Poor family
vegetable greenhouse farms*** owner and farms farms farmers
family farms farms family farms
Land tenure Rent/Ownership Rent/Ownership Ownership Ownership Ownership Ownership/Rent Rent/Share cropping
Farm area 3–6 6–10 3–6 1–20 1–5 1–5 1–3
range (ha)
Number of 2–5 1–2 3–5 1 3–5 1–2 4–10
family workers
Water quota 5,050 5,050 10,100 10,100 15,000 15,000 5,050
(m3/ha/yr)
Main irrigation Micro- Micro- Micro- Gravity Gravity Micro- Gravity
system irrigation irrigation irrigation irrigation and micro- irrigation irrigation
irrigation
Net revenue 3,800 7,500 1,250 400 7,000 12,500 1,050
(US$/ha/yr)**
Net revenue 17,100 60,000 5,625 4,000 21,000 37,500 2,100
(US$/farm/yr)
Notes: * The data represent mean values obtained during a survey of 50 farmers in the Jordan Valley during 2003
 ** As in table 1
 *** Data for absentee-owners using micro-irrigation systems (less than 10% of all citrus farms) are not shown here9
Pricing Water to Control Groundwater Overabstraction
in the Highlands
objective (World Bank 1999; WTO 2001).
Reasons for this decrease in groundwater
abstraction are not clear yet.
4
According to the official figures of the MWI,
total groundwater abstraction in the LJRB in 2004
reached 248 Mm
3, about half of which was used
in agriculture. Of the 2,804 wells registered by the
WAJ in Jordan, 1,412 wells were located in the
LJRB.
5 The total abstraction corresponds to 157
percent of the annual recharge evaluated at 158
Mm
3/yr (THKJ 2004). In 2004, at the subbasin
level, local groundwater abstraction reached 215
percent and 125 percent of the annual recharge in
the AZB and Yarmouk basins, respectively.
Taking into account the return flows from
municipal/industrial and irrigation uses, brings
down the overall net depletion of aquifers of the
LJRB to 119 percent of their annual recharge. Net
depletion in the AZB and Yarmouk basins
averages 159 and 98 percent of their annual
recharge, respectively.
6
The resulting drawdown of the aquifer is
paralleled with a decline in water quality (due to
increasing salinity and use of fertilizers and
pesticides), and it is feared that both domestic
and agricultural uses could be jeopardized,
resulting in further costly investments in water
treatment (ARD and USAID 2001a; Chebaane et
al. 2004; JICA 2004; Venot 2004a). In addition to
these salinity problems, aquifer overdraft incurs
growing pumping costs to all users and
contributes, in some instances, to the abandoning
of wells (Chebaane et al. 2004).
The Problem of Groundwater Overdraft
In Jordan, the first wells were dug during the
1930s in the Azraq oasis, and water for both local
agriculture and domestic uses in Amman was
pumped from them. Wells also existed along
side-wadis and tapped groundwater from
neighboring shallow aquifers. In the Highlands and
notably in the eastern desert region, the shift from
animal husbandry to agricultural activities (based on
the exploitation of groundwater resources) was a
state policy that existed as far back as the 1960s
(when diesel motor pumps were first introduced).
Groundwater exploitation was further developed in
the 1970s and 1980s with the introduction of new
drilling techniques and the establishment of a new
electric network that allowed the use of electric
pumps. Groundwater development also enabled to
meet the domestic and industrial water needs
in Jordan.
Recent records from the Ministry of Water
and Irrigation (MWI) show that, between 1996 and
2003, overall groundwater abstraction in the LJRB
has continuously increased. Domestic use has
steadily risen and industrial use has remained
stable. However, agricultural groundwater
abstraction in the LJRB has continuously
decreased from 158 to 109 Mm
3/yr despite an
increase in irrigated areas. This increase in
irrigated areas is in part due to policies that
support olive oil production and subsidize the
planting of olive trees, although ensuring an
increase in rain-fed production was their main
4 Possible reasons for this trend include: a decreasing pumping capacity of wells as the water table drops; under-reporting due to the
tampering or destruction of water meters; shifts from vegetables to fruits and from fruits to olive trees (Chebaane et al. 2004), and
from furrow to drip irrigation, which may have lessened water abstraction.
5 Out of these 1,412 wells, most are agricultural wells (1,009), while 325 wells are used for domestic purposes and only 78 wells are
used by the industrial sector.
6 Net values are obtained by considering all uses in the LJRB (as recorded by the MWI) and efficiencies of 80 percent for agricultural
uses and 70 percent for industrial and domestic uses. After accounting for return flows, Courcier et al. 2005 found higher values, with
net abstraction at 161 percent and 135 percent of the annual recharge of the AZB and the Yarmouk basins, respectively. The difference
observed for the Yarmouk Basin is due to the fact that abstraction from the governmental Mucheibeh wells (about 20 Mm
3/yr), in the
north of the country, is not accounted for here (they were considered as depleting the Yarmouk Basin in Courcier et al. 2005).10
Groundwater Policies and Bylaw No. 85
of 2002
Faced with such problems and the evidence of a
growing overall scarcity of water, the Government
of Jordan has tried to reorient its water policy
through the ‘Water Strategy Policy’ of 1997
(THKJ and MWI 1997b). Several measures have
been taken to decrease groundwater abstraction,
including: a) freezing of well-drilling authorizations
in 1992; b) implementation of a tax of US$0.35
(hereafter noted $) per cubic meter for any water
pumped and sold/used for industrial or aesthetic
purposes (since 1994) as well as for domestic
purposes (since 2002); c) promulgation of the
‘Groundwater Management Policy’ in 1998 (THKJ
and MWI 1998a) d) a campaign to equip private
wells with water meters; e) reduction of losses in
urban networks; f) promotion of less
water-intensive/high-value crops, and finally
g) promulgation of the ‘Groundwater Bylaw No. 85
of 2002’ (Chebaane et al. 2004). Government
policies called for a massive reduction in
groundwater abstractions (by 86 Mm
3/yr until
2010, and by a further 36 Mm
3/yr until 2020) by
‘pumpers’ in the Highlands (World Bank 2001b).
Water savings elicited by the new water charges
were expected to reach 40 to 50 Mm
3 over the
next 3 to 5 years (Checchi and Devtech 2003).
From 1962 to 1992
7 licenses to drill
agricultural wells were granted by the government.
Two- thirds of the licenses granted specified the
maximum amount of water that each farmer could
pump (most commonly 50,000 or 75,000 m
3/yr/
well, and sometimes 100,000 after 1990; Fitch
2001), but these limits were never enforced
(THKJ and MWI 1997b, 1998a). Farmers, in the
eastern desert area do not feel concerned by
these limits, as they rarely mention them during
interviews and often pump water in excess of the
specified amount. Wells that do not have an
abstraction license are considered ‘illegal’.
In 2002, the groundwater bylaw introduced a
system of quotas combined with taxation of any
use exceeding the quota.  This bylaw was
officially presented as a conservation tool to
preserve the quality of the main Jordanian
aquifers (THKJ and MWI 2002b; THKJ 2004). It
introduced effective metering and fee collection
on water use, and constituted an important first
step in the direction of limiting agricultural
groundwater abstraction. However, instead of
endorsing the previous license quotas, the bylaw
raised the maximum limit of abstraction up to
150,000 m
3 per year and per well—a volume
much higher than the limits mentioned in the
licenses. Rules for the taxation of water pumped
above this limit are detailed in table 3.
7 No drilling license has been delivered after 1992. However, the number of operating wells is continuously increasing as illustrated by
WAJ records of 2004. This may be due to the development of well metering.
TABLE 3.
Water prices according to the volume abstracted in private agricultural wells.
Quantity of water pumped Water prices in wells with Water prices in wells with Water prices in wells
former abstraction license former abstraction license without former abstraction
—2002 bylaw —2004 amendment  license
0–100,000 m3 $0.035/m3 (JD 0.025)
Free Free
101,000 –150,000 m3 $0.042/m3 (JD 0.03)
151,000–200,000 m3 $0.035 m3 (JD 0.025) $0.007/m3 (JD 0.005) $0.05/m3 (JD 0.035)
More than 200,000 m3 $0.085/m3 (JD 0.06) $0.085/m3 (JD 0.06) $0.098/m3 (JD 0.07)
Source: THKJ and MWI 2002b, 2004a: as mentioned in bylaw No.85 of 200211
It is reported that farmer-interest groups have
obtained the canceling of the former licenses
against the acceptance of the principle of taxing
volumes abstracted above a certain limit (Pitman
2004) — technical, institutional and political
difficulties have been impediments to the
effective implementation of the reforms.
Compared with other water fees (notably on
industrial and municipal groundwater use charged
at $0.35/m
3), the fees summarized in table 3 are
very low. Lower quotas and higher tariffs have
been designed for unlicensed wells.
8 In April
2004, the first bills, corresponding to water
consumption between 01/04/2003 and 31/03/2004,
were sent to farmers. Until November 2005, no
employee of the MWI had been entrusted with the
task of collecting fees. Because of this
slackness in the regulation, farmers have not yet
paid these bills. However, fees are cumulative
and could still be collected later.
Between May and August 2004, the
regulation has been modified by introducing two
amendments: the first one being a lowering of
the already low fees for the volumes abstracted
in licensed wells between 150,000 and 200,000
m
3/yr. Volumes of water abstracted are to be
charged at $0.007/m
3 instead of $0.035/m
3 (cf.
table 3). The second amendment relates to
abstraction from brackish aquifers: the higher the
water salinity, the lower the fee would be (not
shown in the table). This will greatly reduce the
impact of the bylaw in the south of the Jordan
Valley and, as such, banana farmers in the area
will continue to deplete the valley aquifer (Venot
2004a). In the Highlands, the second
amendment will not have much impact since the
two main aquifers, in general, have a salinity
level lower than 1,350 ppm (ARD and USAID
2001b), which is below the limit where this
amendment becomes applicable.
Implementing the bylaw is now possible since
most of the wells are equipped with water meters
(94% according to Al-Hadidi [2002]). However,
several more problems must be underlined. First
of all, in 2001 only 61 percent of the meters were
functioning properly (Fitch 2001) and, although
major replacement campaigns have been
conducted, this problem is likely to recur.
Moreover, there is a significant lack of material
and human resources since controls are done by
a small number of employees of the Water
Authority of Jordan (WAJ). In 2006, there were,
for example, only three teams to control the
entire LJRB which is inadequate to effectively
control farmers’ abstractions.
9
Another problem is that the meters are still
not protected. Experience in the Jordan Valley
has shown that if water meters are not protected
in a box closed with a padlock, they are likely to
be broken or at least fiddled with (Courcier and
Guérin 2004). As the meter is paid for by the
farmer, the risks of deterioration are reduced but,
on the other hand, tampering is quite easy and
could become a common practice.
10
8 Unlicensed wells in Jordan are mainly located near the Azraq oasis out of the LJRB limits and in the south of the Jordan Valley,
where they tap the brackish aquifer. For the sake of simplification, we will consider that all wells in the Highlands of the LJRB have a
license.
9 According to the head of one of these teams, each team is made up of two engineers in charge of water meter reading, one
technician in charge of meter maintenance and two drivers. The team in charge of the surroundings of Amman is supposed to control
around 400 wells monthly. This means about 10 wells per working day and per group of readers (the team can be divided into two
groups, if cars are available). Wells are very widely scattered and vehicles are not always available. These conditions impede frequent
controls.
10 On an anecdotal plan, during one survey in the Highlands, a farmer told us that he telephoned the WAJ in Amman and managed
to have the controller come to his farm to read the meter again, two days after he had received his water bill. The first time, the water
bill indicated fees to be paid based on a consumption of 270,000 cubic meters. After this visit and a new reading of the meter, the
WAJ employee agreed that the bill was not accurate since the consumption of the well ‘only’ reached 148,000 cubic meters. Thanks
to a phone call, the farmer managed to save about $4,200 either because the first evaluation was really inaccurate, or because the
farmer tampered with the meter, bribed the government official, etc.12
Financial Impacts and Expected
Adjustments in the Eastern Desert’s
Farming Systems
Based on the description of farming systems
presented earlier, this section explores the
financial impact of the bylaw on each type of
farming system, and how farmers could mitigate
or minimize it by adopting appropriate strategies.
Financial Impacts of the Bylaw on Farming
Systems
Table 4 summarizes these financial impacts (before
[scenario A] and after [scenario B] the
2004-amendment) on farms with licensed wells,
assuming that actual withdrawals remain unchanged
and that farmers squarely foot the extra water bill.
Settled Bedouins with their fruit-tree farms
and absentee-owners with their ‘prestige’
olive-tree farms will not be affected by the bylaw
since their current annual water consumption is
lower than 150,000 m
3 per well. Fruit-tree farmers
will be very slightly affected by the bylaw. Table 4
illustrates that the amendment considerably
softened the financial impact of the bylaw on
settled Bedouins (with vegetables or mixed farms)
and on absentee-owners (with vegetables).
11
To assess possible behaviors by farmers, it is
necessary to know what the present irrigation
11 For mixed farms owned by settled Bedouins, we have presented a case where farmers have only one well. In these conditions,
impacts of the bylaw are expected to be high. However, many of these farmers have two separate wells that they use alternatively to
irrigate two different plots. As such, the bylaw will not have any impact on them and, therefore, no changes are expected to occur.
12 Water abstraction costs can be divided into operational costs of the wells (diesel or electricity) and renting costs for tenants or
maintenance/depreciation costs for owners (Venot 2004a).
TABLE 4.
Bylaw impact on farm income in the eastern desert.
12
Settled Bedouins Stone-fruit tree entrepreneurs Absentee-owners
Family Mixed farm— Family fruit- Intensive Intensive Prestige Extensive
vegetable vegetables tree farms entrepreneurial absentee- olive tree open-field




Net revenue 1,100 621 6,900 16,000 14,850 300 600
(US$/ha/yr)
Water use 216,000 284,750 150,000 300,000 435,000 137,500 216,000
(m3/farm/yr)
Actual water US$/ha/yr 2,181 1,513 1,373 1,310 1,310 432 1,875
abstraction
costs US$/farm/yr 49,072 52,955 20,595 39,300 78,600 10,800 42,187
% of current 198 243 19.3 8.2 8.8 144 312
revenue
Scenario A— US$/ha/yr 138 259 - 342 108 - 138
Extra water
costs bylaw US$/farm/yr 3,110 9,050 - 10,250 6,475 - 3,110
Scenario B— US$/ha/yr 76 217 - 295 61 - 76
Extra water
costs bylaw US$/farm/yr 1,710 7,621 - 8,850 3,675 - 1,710
and
amendment
Revenue Scenario A 12.6 41.6 - 2.1 0.7 - 23.0
decrease
(% of Scenario B 6.9 35 - 1.8 0.4 - 12.7
current
revenue)13
efficiency in the eastern desert is, and to what
extent the quantity of water supplied to crops
matches their water requirements. Table 5 indicates
that orchards (especially olive trees)
13 are under-
irrigated with regard to full agronomic requirements:
further water savings are thus unlikely. On the other
hand, vegetable farmers seem to over-irrigate their
crops: they abstract nearly 160 percent of the net
crop water requirements, as evaluated by Fitch
(2001). In this condition, the overall efficiency of
water use only reaches 62 percent and can be
improved without affecting production. If we assume
that on-farm irrigation efficiency can reach a
maximum of 75 percent, vegetable farmers could
decrease the amount of water they pump from
216,000 m
3 to 179,700 m
3, while still meeting net
crop water requirements.
area as well (water use efficiency remains
constant); 3) strategy C is like strategy B
(pumping of 150,000 m
3/well/yr), but farmers also
improve their irrigation efficiency up to 75 percent
and so reduce their cultivated area to a lesser
extent; 4) strategy D expects farmers to increase
irrigation efficiency up to 75 percent (still meeting
crop water requirements): they keep the same
cultivated area and reduce water abstraction
accordingly; and 5) strategy E is like strategy D
(irrigation efficiency increase up to 75%) but
farmers do not reduce abstraction and use the
water saved to increase the cultivated area.
We hypothesize that irrigation efficiency can
be improved up to a maximum of 75 percent
through: a) a better design of farm network; b) the
use of higher-quality emitters; c) better on-farm
The financial impacts at the farm level of five
different strategies are presented below:
1) strategy A assumes that farmers pay their water
bills without changing their water consumption
pattern (business as usual, see table 6);
2) strategy B assumes a maximization of water
savings by  decreasing the use of water to
150,000 m
3/well/yr (so that no fee needs to be
paid), and a proportional reduction in the cultivated
operations; d) use of skilled labor; and e) a better
monitoring of soil water reserves that would allow
fine-tuning of irrigation. We consider that such
changes in the open field vegetable farming
systems require similar investments than in the
Jordan Valley ($970/ha; see section on Water
Pricing in the Jordan Valley). Improving irrigation
efficiency also induces additional running costs
($370/ha/yr; Courcier [2006])
14 and an increase in
13 Only 56 percent of olive orchard water requirements are met: this very low satisfaction of the demand of olive trees (also observed
by Hanson 2000) illustrates their drought-tolerance quality and also their very low profitability. Deficit irrigation highlights also that
these orchards have a high social value and that their conventional economic profitability is not of prime importance to farmers.
Farmer strategies do not boil down here to profit maximization.
14 The incremental cost for increasing efficiency up to 75 percent in open field vegetable farms can be broken down into $90/ha/year
of incremental wages and $280/ha/year for dripper lines as well as for primary and secondary pipes, filters and tensiometers. Due to
an increase in the value of the production, increasing efficiency is cost effective. Moreover, the cost is also lower than the extra
revenue that farmers would derive from expanding their fields and using saved water. In spite of the availability of this option, there
are other constraints that deter ‘farmer-maximizers’ from increasing irrigation efficiency in their systems. These include aversion to risk
or to incremental labor and time to be spent on the farm, as well as a low investment capacity, especially in a situation where most
Bedouin farmers are already indebted (Chebaane et al. 2004)—(see Molle and Berkoff [2007] for a detailed description of the reasons
that hinder intensification and see the section on ‘Water Pricing in the Jordan Valley’, where this argument is further developed). To
increase efficiency above 75 percent, there is an additional need for skilled engineers as well as computerized systems: this would
induce high costs (compared to farmer’s revenue: $1,400/ha/yr [Courcier 2006]) that make such an evolution unlikely.
TABLE 5.
Evaluation of gross water abstraction and net water requirements in the eastern deserts of the LJRB (m3/ha).
Vegetables Olive trees Other fruit trees
Net water requirement 5,990 6,880 10,320
(adapted from Fitch 2001, cf. appendix 2)
Gross water abstraction 9,600 5,500 10,000
(based on interviews with farmers)14
the value of the production by 10 to 15 percent.
The net financial result is positive with an
additional revenue of about $150/ha/yr ($100/ha/yr
in absentee-owner systems). Contrary to common
assumptions that farmers can easily save
substantial amounts of water by just being ‘more
careful’, improvements demand better knowledge
and material and thus have a cost involved,
especially in a situation where micro-irrigation is
already in use. In spite of the cost incurred,
these improvements can also generate benefits
due to increase in yields. The willingness/ability
of farmers to achieve these improvements will
depend on their relative costs and benefits which
are difficult to assess.
Adjustments to be Observed in Open-field
Vegetable and Mixed Farms
Table 6 summarizes the impacts of the five
strategies on vegetable farms run by settled
Bedouins or absentee-owners.
For settled Bedouins who cultivate vegetables
in open fields, paying the water fee (strategy A)
entails a decrease in revenue of 6.9 percent,
even though farmers already face water costs
that are higher than their net income (cf. table 4).
This impact remains modest and it is unlikely
that it will alter the perception of the farmers on
the constraints to intensification. In comparison,
reducing the land area until water abstraction is
curtailed down to 150,000 m
3/well/yr entails a
decrease in income of 31 percent (strategy B)
and 5 percent (strategy C), respectively.
Improving efficiency without increasing cropping
area (strategy D) induces an increase in revenue
by 13 percent (depending on the yield responses
to better irrigation uniformity). Finally, strategy E
appears as the best option with a 29 percent
increase in farm revenue, following an expansion
of the irrigated area and higher yields.
In general, technology costs are higher than
the savings in the water bill unless prices are
TABLE 6.
Financial effects of the bylaw (with amendment) on settled Bedouins’ farms and absentee-owner vegetable farms
according to five response strategies.
Settled Bedouins Absentee-owner
Open-field Mixed farm— Open-field farm
vegetable family  vegetables and
farm olive trees
Volume abstracted (m3/well/yr) 216,000 284,750 216,000
Strategy A
(business as usual) Change in revenue—US$/ha/yr $ -76 (-6.9%) $ -217 (-35%) $ -76 (-12.7%)
and % of current revenue
Volume abstracted (m3/well/yr) 150,000 150,000 150,000
Strategy B
Change in revenue—US$/ha/yr $ -341 (-31%) $ -264 (-43%) $ -186 (-31%)
and % of current revenue
Volume abstracted (m3/well/yr) 150,000 150,000 150,000
Strategy C
Change in revenue—US$/ha/yr $ -57 (-5%) $ -174 (-28%) $ -16 (-3%)
and % of current revenue
Volume abstracted (m3/well/yr) 179,700 248,450 179,700
Strategy D
Change in revenue—US$/ha/yr $ +141 (+13%) $ -31 (+5%)* $ +91 (+8%)
and % of current revenue
Volume abstracted (m3/well/yr) 216,000 284,750 216,000
Strategy E
Change in revenue—US$/ha/yr $+326 (+29%) $+4 (<+1%)* $+165 (+15%)
and % of current revenue
 Note: * Water abstraction for olive trees has been considered constant. The low profitability of the orchard is not modified15
taken at very high levels (improving irrigation
systems in open field vegetable farms would cost
five times as much as the maximum resulting
savings in the water bill, the cropping area being
considered constant). Furthermore, the existing
incentives to intensification (i.e., higher revenue
and yields due to better uniformity of irrigation)
would be reduced by water price increases, since
relative gains would be lower than at current water
prices. Finally, in regions with abundant land,
savings derived from improved irrigation efficiency
can be used to expand the cropping area in a
cost-effective way (strategy E): this defeats the
conservation objective of pricing mechanisms, but
is economically interesting. Since they deplete
incomes, notably in the less productive farming
systems, high water costs may also trigger
adoption of higher-value crops and thereby,
enhance water productivity (see below).
Conclusions for absentee-owners are similar:
strategy E is the best option (+15%) and strategy
B, the worst. Another possible strategy for
well-owners would be to rent out their wells to
major entrepreneurial fruit-tree farmers or to cities
(cf. below). It is noteworthy that these
conclusions would not have been significantly
different with the pre-amendment price of water.
To avoid paying any water fee (like in
strategy B), settled Bedouins with mixed farms
would have to decrease their current abstraction
of 284,750 m
3/well/yr by 47 percent. This,
however, will result in a drop in the income by
43 percent (as the farmer would first have to
abandon his olive orchard and then shrink its
vegetable area). The average income is so low
that paying the fees (strategy A) would entail a
35 percent decrease in revenue (pre-amendment
water prices would have sent a stronger signal
but at the cost of more than half the current
income). Strategy C would be slightly better with
an expected decrease in revenue of about 28
percent. Finally, as in the case of vegetables in
the open field, keeping or expanding the cropping
area (or changing crops) and improving efficiency
(strategies D and E) would offset the financial
loss due to the bylaw. The last two strategies
(D and E) entail a 5 and 1 percent increase in
farmers’ revenue, respectively. Benefits derived
from strategies D and E are lower in mixed farms
than in open-field vegetable farms, because of
the much higher water abstraction that reaches
the high tariff-block (table 3).
Adjustments to be Observed in Entrepreneurial
Fruit-tree Farms
Intensive stone-fruit tree entrepreneurs will be
slightly affected by the bylaw. In line with their
large water abstraction, farmers will have to pay
high water fees (between $3,675 and $8,850 per
farm according to the farming system, cf. table
4). However, due to the high profitability of these
farming systems, this increase in water costs will
have a negligible impact on farmers’ revenue,
which would decrease by less than 2 percent.
In all likelihood, therefore, strategy A
(business as usual) will prevail, i.e., farmers will
squarely foot the bill. In systems where trees are
under-irrigated (cf. table 5) and efficiency is
already high (stone fruit orchards are closely
managed and irrigation networks operate at their
optimum), adoption of strategies C and D
(increasing irrigation efficiency) are very unlikely.
Strategies B and E, however, might also be
feasible if farmers have the possibility to rent an
additional nearby well. This new well would
provide for both the shortfall of water for the old
orchard (strategy B) and the additional water
needed for expansion (strategies B and E). The
availability of vast expanses of flat desert would
make this option quite easy to adopt (although it
is illegal, because areas attached to a particular
well are normally specified), and economic
calculations show that such an expansion would
be profitable, even with the additional cost of
renting a well (about $18,000/well/year). This rent
is higher than the total revenue generated by
extensive open-field farms managed by absentee-
owners (cf. table 4). Renting out their wells would
thus provide them with a regular income, higher
than the one they already have (or that they
could have if they adopted any of the strategies
from A to E), which can be attractive if they can
also find other means of employment. This could
accentuate the current increase in stone-fruit
production by entrepreneurial farmers in the16
Highlands. In such a case, there will not be any
water savings. Nevertheless, a higher productivity
will be achieved through the shift from vegetables
to fruit trees.
Water Savings at a Regional Scale
Evaluation of Agricultural Water Abstraction in
the Highlands
In 2004, the MWI and the GTZ carried out a
land-use mapping based on two mosaics of
LandSat images, dated August 1999 and May
2000, respectively. These data were used to
estimate irrigated areas within the Amman-Zarqa
and Yarmouk groundwater basins, and are
summarized in appendix 3. Of the 14,460 hectares
cultivated in the two groundwater basins mentioned
above, 82 percent is located in the eastern desert
area, i.e., a total area of 11,835 hectares.
Based on these estimates of irrigated areas
and data on crop water use, we can approximate
the groundwater abstraction in the Amman-Zarqa
and the Yarmouk basins (cf. table 7). These
evaluations are compared with earlier estimates
obtained from other sources. Annual recharge
values are drawn from THKJ (2004).
Table 7 indicates that the gross agricultural
abstraction records of the MWI are 20 percent
less than other evaluations. The MWI may
underestimate present agricultural abstraction
partly because of the problems surrounding water
metering that have been mentioned above. In “our
estimate,” gross abstraction rates are presently
reaching 249 and 195 percent of the annual
recharge in the Amman-Zarqa and Yarmouk
basins, respectively. By computing return flows of
irrigation and municipal/industrial uses, the
exploitation rates decreased to 179 and 168
percent of the annual recharges of the
Amman-Zarqa and Yarmouk basins, respectively
(net abstraction of 121 and 63 Mm
3/yr).
15 These
estimates will be used as a baseline situation in
the following sections to assess the amount of
possible water savings in the two groundwater
basins considered here.
15 These values are slightly higher than those presented in the section on ‘The Problem of Groundwater Overdraft’ that were calculated
on the basis of official values of groundwater abstraction presented by the MWI.
16 We used average gross abstraction rates as follows: 8,500 and 11,400 m
3/ha for vegetables and fruit trees, respectively (average
between Fitch 2001 and our surveys; cf. table 5) and 5,500 m
3/ha for olive trees. Crops also receive between 100 and 200 mm of rainfall
each year. Municipal and Industrial (M&I) groundwater abstraction has been computed according to MWI records for the year 2004. The
net abstraction is based on efficiencies of 70 percent in vegetables and olive-tree agriculture, 80 percent for other fruit trees, and 70
percent in the domestic and industrial sectors. We assumed that all the water not used by crops infiltrates back to the aquifer.
TABLE 7.
Different evaluations of agricultural groundwater abstraction in the Amman-Zarqa and Yarmouk basins.16
Amman-Zarqa Basin Yarmouk Basin
(Annual recharge: 67.5 Mm3/yr) (Annual recharge:37.5 Mm3/yr)
                        Total abstraction Agricultural Total abstraction Agricultural
% of abstraction % of abstraction
Volume annual (Mm3/yr) Volume annual (Mm3/yr)
(Mm3/yr) recharge (Mm3/yr) recharge
Earlier estimates
MWI—gross abstraction records for 145 216 60 47 100 37
the year 2004
Total gross abstraction according to 155 230 80           No Data
ARD (2001)—provision for the year 2002
Our estimate
Gross abstraction 168 249 83 73 195 63
Net abstraction 121 179 60 63 168 5517
Evaluation of Possible Water Savings in the
Highlands
Table 8 presents the different classes of
agricultural wells according to their yearly
production in the two groundwater basins of
Amman-Zarqa and Yarmouk. Out of the 606 wells
located in the Amman-Zarqa and Yarmouk basins,
only 182 yield more than 150,000 m
3/yr and will
be impacted by the bylaw.
17 Discounting wells
producing more than 500,000 m
3/yr,
18 this figure
further drops to 166 wells, which in turn represent
62 percent and 7 percent of the water abstracted
in the Amman-Zarqa and Yarmouk basins,
respectively. In addition, as mentioned earlier,
only settled Bedouins with vegetables or mixed
farms and absentee-owners with vegetable farms
are likely to be affected by the bylaw. Eventually,
only 83 wells (90% of these in the Amman-Zarqa
Basin) will be affected by the bylaw in the
eastern desert of the LJRB.
We focus here on possible short-term
impacts of the bylaw at a regional scale in terms
of water savings, agricultural area reduction, and
WAJ-revenue increase. Long-term impacts in
terms of employment losses, migration, increase
in energy costs, and yield decrease due to
aquifer degradation, etc., are not discussed here
(see Fitch 2001; ARD and USAID 2001a and
Chebaane et al. 2004 for quantification on the
Amman-Zarqa Basin). Regional water savings can
be assessed based on the five strategies
considered earlier by aggregating responses
expected for each type of farm.
Table 9 shows that the maximum gross water
savings to be expected in vegetable plots in the
eastern deserts are about 5.5 Mm
3/yr (90% of
these in the Amman-Zarqa Basin: strategies B
and C). The highest net savings would be
obtained if all vegetable farmers decreased their
water application and the irrigated area by
17 That is, 38 percent of all wells likely to be affected by the bylaw in Jordan.
18 These wells are governmental wells. Water is either used locally (Amman-Zarqa Basin) or pumped to be transferred and used in the
Jordan Valley (Mucheibeh wells in the Yarmouk Basin). They will not be affected by the bylaw although limiting this water transfer
could lead to substantial water savings at the regional scale. Ensuring that wells producing more than 500,000 m
3/yr would decrease
production to 150,000 m
3/yr would allow savings of 3.1 and 27.4 Mm
3 in the Amman-Zarqa and the Yarmouk basins (i.e., 70 percent
of the maximum expected water savings in the two groundwater basins) but will have dramatic impacts on Jordan valley agriculture.
TABLE 8.
Structure of agricultural groundwater exploitation in the Highlands.
Amman-Zarqa Basin Yarmouk Basin
Classes of
water abstraction Number of Total production Number of Total production
(Mm3/well/yr) wells (Mm3/yr) wells (Mm3/yr)
   0–50 157 3.4 37 0.8
 50–100 84 6.0 31 2.3
100–150 92 11.6 23 2.8
150–200 71 12.4 12 2.0
200–300 54 12.7 2 0.4
300–400 20 6.9 1 0.3
400–500 6 2.7 0 0.0
>500 7 4.1 9 28.7
Total 491 59.8 115 37.3
Source: MWI records for the year 200418
one-third on an average basis, while maintaining
their actual water use efficiency (strategy B). This
would lead to high agricultural losses ($2.5
million, not shown in the table). This response,
however, is not the one that the incentives in
place are likely to prompt.
In strategy A, nothing is changed except for
a transfer of $0.21 million in revenue from
vegetable farmers to the state coffers, or a total
of $0.84 million when all farm payments are
considered. Improving efficiency without
increasing cropping area (strategy D) would
reduce abstracted volumes to around 179,700 m
3/
well/yr in vegetable farms. In such conditions,
gross water savings would reach 3.0 Mm
3/yr and
the regional gross overdraft would be decreased
by about 2.2 percent. However, net abstraction
would not be affected by this change.
Finally, strategy E would lead to increasing the
depleted fraction by about 2.3 Mm
3/yr (as cropping
area and efficiency increase, and return flows are
reduced), which defeats the objective of the bylaw.
In general, encouraging higher efficiency in
conditions where land is not a constraint is
counterproductive to the objective of reducing the
depletion of water resources. The fact, however,
that expanding cultivation by using saved water
is—on paper—financially profitable, but not
observed in practice, suggests that the real costs
of increasing efficiency may be higher than what is
shown, and that farmers face other constraints to
developing their agricultural activity, notably higher
opportunity costs for entrepreneurs with multiple
economic activities (Van Aken 2004).
In conclusion, we can say that the
implementation of the bylaw in its current
19 For scenarios C and to E, all calculations have been done considering an achievable irrigation efficiency of 75 percent (in vegetable
farms). For scenarios A and B we considered the present efficiency in vegetable farms (62%). System efficiencies in olive and other
orchards have been considered homogeneous at 70 percent and 80 percent, respectively in the five scenarios. Gross and net
overdrafts indicate the gaps between gross or net abstraction and annual recharge, respectively.
TABLE 9.
Impact of the bylaw on vegetable farms at the basin level (eastern desert zone).
19
Abstraction Gross water savings Net water savings Depleted Government Overall
(m3/well/yr) (Mm3/year) (Mm3/year) fraction in revenue from government
vegetables vegetable revenue
% of % of (Mm3/year) farms (Million US$/yr)
current current (Million US$/yr)
(Mm3/year) gross (Mm3/year) net
overdraft overdraft
Present situation 216,000 - - - - 11.1 - -












Improving efficiency 179,700 3.0 2.2 - - 11.1 0.012 0.63
with constant area
Strategy E:
Improving efficiency 216,000 - - -2.3 -2.9 13.4 0.21 0.84
with  increased area19
version will not lead to significant water savings.
Because of the threshold of 150,000 m
3 and the
public wells that are not targeted by the by-law,
72 percent of the wells in the Amman-Zarqa and
Yarmouk basins will not be affected by the
bylaw (a threshold of 100,000 m
3 would take this
proportion down to 53%). Olive orchards, for
example, which represent 32 percent of the total
agricultural water abstraction in the Highlands
and qualify as the prime target of policies
because of their low water productivity
(WP=$0.05/m
3), will not be affected. If we add to
this the facts that high-value crops such as
fruit-trees (WP=$1.1/m
3) will be financially little
affected and farmers’ behavior unlikely to
change, then the wells concerned correspond to
only 11 percent of the total water abstraction
(16.1 and 1.8 Mm
3/yr in the Amman-Zarqa and
Yarmouk basins, respectively).
Vegetable and mixed farms are the most
vulnerable to hikes in water charges. Their
income being so low that any additional
production cost will depress them further.
However, whether substantial water savings will
be achieved in these farms remain uncertain and
depends on the balance between costs and
benefits of improving irrigation efficiency.
Investments in technology and qualified labor are:
a) beyond the capacity of most of these farmers,
many of whom are indebted, and b) higher than
gains resulting from a reduced water bill, unless
yields and products quality positively respond to
a better uniformity of irrigation. Upper (optimistic)
estimates of reduction in gross water abstraction
(strategy B for vegetable and mixed farms) point
to a decrease of 4 percent, i.e., 5.5 Mm
3/yr, a
drop in an ocean of overabstraction, and quite
short of the 40–50 Mm
3 expected.
20 Revenue to
the government is expected to vary between
$0.63 and 0.84 million/year, not considering the
costs of collection and enforcement.
Would higher tariffs (like in the pre-amendment
price table, for example), or a lower threshold for
the first block, be more effective? Was the bylaw
nullified by the downward revision of the charges
in 2004? With higher charges, olive orchards and
fruit-tree farms would remain insulated, but the
pressure would be borne by the most vulnerable
vegetable and mixed farms. With a lower
threshold, however, olive orchards too would be
under pressure. In all likelihood, only a few of
these farms would be in a position to invest in
order to achieve better efficiency (and existing
potential gains from intensification [due to higher
yields] would be negated by higher water costs).
Affected farmers might just opt to decrease their
cultivated area and thereby, the amount of water
abstracted (incurring a loss in their income) until
they reach the threshold and can avoid water
charges completely.
They might as well sell their water to
neighboring fruit farmers, rent out their wells
(if they own them), and move out of agriculture
altogether. This would amount to a shift in
production from vegetable farming and olive trees
to higher-value fruit production, and would
definitely raise the productivity of water, but a)
benefits would accrue to wealthier entrepreneurs;
b) this would defeat earlier social policies aimed
at settling Bedouins by providing them
opportunities in the agriculture sector (Chebaane
et al. 2004), unless these are able to find
equivalent or better job opportunities; c) the
amount of water used would not be radically
altered; d) water demand would become
extremely inelastic because of the high crop
return. Finally, the shift to higher efficiency fruit
(or other) production could have the perverse
consequence of allowing expansion of orchards,
with lower return flow to the aquifer, greater
depletion of water, and thus worsening the status
of the aquifer (strategy E).
Because of the large percentage of
unaffected farmers and likely impacts in terms of
crop shifts rather than of improvements in
efficiency, a substantial drop in water abstraction
can be achieved only through the diminution of
either the cultivated area or the number of wells
20 If abstraction of all private wells was to be reduced to 150,000 m
3/yr, total gross water savings would reach 12.5 Mm
3/yr.20
in use. As demonstrated above, negative
incentives (reduced thresholds, higher tariffs,
petrol taxation, stricter enforcement, etc.,) cannot
achieve this without displacing financially weaker
farmers and strictly prohibiting the selling of
wells. Recent political crises suggest that such
extreme measures are unlikely to be accepted.
Attendant positive incentives that are more
promising include:, 1) buying-out of wells
(a measure envisaged by the government and
received positively by 50 % of farmers [Chebaane
et al. 2004]); 2) paying adequate compensation
for the uprooting of olive trees in the eastern
desert (Fitch 2001); and 3) substituting treated
wastewater for groundwater (ARD and USAID,
2001c). Additional measures that may assist in
decreasing groundwater abstraction include:
1) reduction of losses in urban networks; and
2) having educational and public awareness
programs for water users. Allowing the transfer of
water to neighboring orchards or the possibility of
having vegetable farmers renting out their wells
would provide them a financial compensation but
would not contribute towards the conservation
objectives [Chebaane et al. 2004]). Finally, the
removal of petrol subsidies for well operation or
imposing higher taxation of water must be
accompanied by measures that provide
alternatives to people moving out of low-value
agriculture, as for example, subsidies or secure
market opportunities to help viable farms to
intensify production.
Water Pricing in the Jordan Valley
Current System of Allocation: Quotas
and Water Prices
A Historical System of Water Allocation
From the beginning of large-scale irrigation in the
Jordan Valley, in the 1960s, water has been
allocated through a system of crop-based water
quotas. Volumetric pricing was also initiated in
1961, with a cost of 1 fils/m
3 (Hussein 2002; one
fils is equivalent to 0.001 JD or $0.0014). The
official quota system has undergone several
changes since the 1960s and has been primarily
used as a guideline, with adaptations made
according to circumstances and national priorities
(THKJ and JVA 1988 and 2001).
Between the 1960s and the 1980s, quotas
were based on crop water requirements as
calculated by Baker and Harza in 1955 (and
summarized in appendix 4).
21 ‘The Jordan Valley
Development Law No.19 of 1988’ defined new
quotas (THKJ and JVA 1988)—until the end of
the 1990s, each plot of vegetable grown between
mid-April and mid-December received 2 mm of
water per day (during the rest of the year water
was allocated on demand). Citrus and bananas
were supplied with 4 and 8 mm per day,
respectively, from the beginning of May to the
end of October (and on demand during the rest of
the year, when demand is low).
Bananas and citrus, which were traditionally
cultivated in the northern part of the Jordan
Valley, are highly water-consuming crops (Khouri
1981; Elmusa 1994; Jridi 2002; Suleiman 2004).
In the early 1990s, the government decided to
‘freeze’ cropping patterns in the Jordan Valley and
to grant ‘vegetable allowances’ to all areas not
covered by orchards at the time, with the intent
of limiting the expansion of bananas and citrus.
This has institutionalized some inequity in the
access to water in the Jordan Valley: major
21 Quotas used at that time are not precisely known. Crop water requirements as calculated in 1955 were certainly used as rough
guidelines for water allocation although at that time water problems were not yet experienced in the Jordan Valley and fields were
supplied by gravity canals.21
landowners (mainly citrus owners) as well as
entrepreneurial farmers (with highly profitable
banana plantations, although profitability is partly
enhanced by import tariffs) are the main
beneficiaries of the quota system.
Banana orchards planted before 1991 are the
only areas to be entitled ‘banana allowances’: any
area planted with bananas after the specified date
is considered ‘illegal’—even if no sanctions have
been taken—and do not receive the corresponding
quota. In 2004, however, in contradiction to its
policy to reduce demand, the JVA legalized citrus
orchards planted between 1991 and 2001; granting
them citrus allowance instead of the vegetable
allowance they were receiving earlier. All other
areas were afforded the vegetable allowance,
subject to an assurance given by the farmer to the
JVA that he is cultivating his plot of land.
22
The 1997–1999 period was marked by a
severe drought, which strained the resources of
the Kingdom and compelled the administrators
to make ad-hoc reductions in the allowances of
water to the farms. In 1999, vegetable and
citrus farmers were granted 75 percent of their
entitled water allocation, while banana farmers
received 85 percent of their quota. Allocations
were reduced by 25 percent in 2000 and 2003,
and by 50 and 40 percent during the summers
of 2001 and 2002, respectively (MREA and JVA
2006). Some areas were left fallow and yields
were significantly impacted, notably in citrus
and banana plantations. Lower quotas have
been maintained ever since (except in the
south of the Jordan Valley, where treated
wastewater is used).
In 2004, the JVA established new quotas to
better match supply of water and crop water
requirements (THKJ and JVA 2004; see table 10).
The annual values of these revised quotas are
almost similar to the reduced quotas of 1999.
Before 1999, official allowances between April
and November totaled 4,800, 9,500 and 17,200
m
3/ha for vegetables, citrus and bananas,
respectively. The new quotas correspond to
3,600, 7,650 and 12,550 m
3/ha for vegetables,
citrus and bananas, respectively, i.e., a cut by
about 20 to 25 percent.
23 At a regional scale, this
generated total freshwater savings in the northern
and middle directorates (where the rules apply) of
approximately 20.2 Mm
3/yr (between April and
November).
24 The water saved was subsequently
reallocated to domestic use in Amman.
22 It is not rare to see some farmers ‘hiding’ some trees (either bananas for their high profitability or citrus for their relatively easy
management) on a small share of their farm although they are only eligible to the vegetable allotment. This kind of adjustment reveals
that the farmer prefers to cultivate a smaller area of high water-consuming crops than his entire farm with vegetables, especially when
other economic activities are available (daily wage labor in other farms or in the construction sector) — (Bourdin 2001; Petitguyot
2003). The farmer is running only a limited risk by adopting this approach since there are very few controls of cropping pattern by the
Ministry of Agriculture, and even fewer sanctions taken by the JVA.
23 In this section, economic calculations are based on theoretical volumes supplied to farmers (we tried to collect bills from farmers in
order to assess individual and effective consumption, but it proved to be unviable because most of them did not have bills for one
year on hand —bills are issued every month—and most had paid the full quota because water meters were broken or consumption
lower than 75 percent of their allocation [see below]). Because of conveyance losses the effective quantity of water supplied to the
crops is lower than these theoretical volumes. On the other hand, many farmers also use water coming from the side-wadis and,
sometimes, wells (Refer to THKJ et al. 2001; Guérin and Courcier 2004 for further information on irrigation efficiency and potential
improvement in the Jordan Valley).
Extra hours are not considered in this allocation. Extra hours are requested by farmers for exceptional needs and, subject to decisions
by the JVA, granted in the same amounts to every farmer of a network at specific periods (for example, at the time of land preparation,
or ‘solarization’, or during exceptionally hot periods). This system is the main source of flexibility in an otherwise, quite rigid allocation
system. Petitguyot (2003) has shown, for one pumping station in the middle of the Jordan Valley that, on a yearly basis (in 2003), the
required amount of extra hours average to 23 percent of the quota allocation.
24 This 8-month period is particularly crucial since water availability is low and water requirements are high. Trees need high supply during
the entire period. Vegetables do not require water during the entire period (very few vegetables are grown between May and July) but
requirements are high in April (harvest) and in September/October (for solarization, soil preparation and plantation) — (cf. appendix 7).22
O&M costs)—(GTZ 1993). Likewise, THJK (2004)
indicates that the ratio of average capital costs to
O&M was 2.07 during the 1997–2002 period.
Based on the current block tariff system (in
place since 1995; cf. appendix 5; the proposed
increase for freshwater has been postponed) and
on the current quota system (cf. table 10), we
have estimated the yearly cost of water per cubic
meter and per hectare for three types of crop
(vegetable, citrus and banana; see appendix 6).
We assume that farmers use their full (new)
quotas when supply is restricted and consider
average water consumption for the on-demand
period.
25 Total water costs for the farmers are
higher in banana plantations ($350/ha/yr) than in
citrus orchards ($138/ha/yr). They are lowest in
vegetable farms where the water consumption is
also low ($67/ha/yr). Differences in water charges
for each crop are lower than they were in the past,
since uses have been capped—the main
beneficiaries of this evolution are banana farmers
whose consumption reaches expensive tariff
blocks less frequently than before. Implementing
the new quotas led to lower water use and
consequently to a lower overall recovery of O&M
Operation and Maintenance Costs Recovery
JVA’s revenues from irrigation water have
gradually increased with time, as water charges
established at 1 fils/m
3 (0.14 cent/m
3) in 1961
being increased to 0.42 cent/m
3, then to 0.84
cent/m
3 in 1989, and to an average of 2.1 cent/m
3
in 1996 (GTZ 1993; FORWARD 1998; the planned
increase up to 25 fils has been put off).
Revenues from charges covered one-sixth of
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs during
the 1988–1992 period (GTZ 1993; Hussein
2002), implying an average annual subsidy of
$3.4 million. In 1995, revenues accounted for
less than a quarter of O&M costs. Water
charges were then increased more than twofold
in 1996. In 1997, with a rate of non-payment of
20 percent, average revenues amounted to 1.7
cent/m
3, against 2.5 cent/m
3 of O&M costs (i.e.,
a recovery rate of 68%)—(FORWARD 1998;
World Bank 2001b).
Calculations made over the 1988–1992 period
show that fixed asset depreciation and financing
costs were twice as large as proper O&M costs
(total costs were thus three times higher than
25 Annual allotments average at 5,050, 10,100 and 15,000 m
3/ha for vegetables, citrus and bananas, respectively. Extra hours are
not accounted for.
TABLE 10.
Current quota system (implemented from 2004 onwards).
Quotas (m3/ha/day)
Vegetables Citrus Bananas















On-demand but < 20
20
Period of the year23
costs (fees are volumetric, fixed costs such as
salaries do not vary with effective supply; and
maintenance costs—canals, pumping stations—do
not decrease proportionally to volumes of water).
Water is now charged at an average of 1.8 cent/m
3
(against 2.1 cent/m
3 in 1997; see above).
26 In line
with these recent evaluations and despite
substantial differences between sources, we will
consider here that current charges cover 72
percent of O&M costs and that full costs are three
times higher than O&M costs (THKJ 2004).
27
Possible Responses to Increased
Water Costs
Farmers may respond to the drop in income
resulting from higher water prices in several
ways, including: a) saving water by improving
on-farm water management practices; b) adopting
improved irrigation technology; c) shifting cropping
patterns; d) renting out land, or discontinuing
agriculture in the case of a tenant; e) other
secondary responses such as illegal water use,
bribery, and tampering of structures; and f) doing
nothing (and paying the higher water charges).
The response selected depends on the relative
costs and benefits of the different options
available to the farmer. Beyond their economic
impact the first four options above are
constrained by technical, financial and human
factors that need to be made explicit.
On-farm Management
By improving on-farm water application farmers
may reduce water losses and, thereby possibly
decrease farm water requirements and
corresponding water costs. Yet, there are several
constraints to increasing on-farm irrigation
efficiency (whose evaluation remains a difficult
task; see box 1) under current conditions, for
example:
• Despite being conceived as a demand-based
system, subject to the limitation of quotas,
the actual mode of operation of the JVA and
the uncontrolled nature of the inflow from the
Yarmouk River do not allow a reliable supply
of water (Courcier and Guerin 2004). Farmers
experience many difficulties because of
deficiencies in collective pressurized
networks that result in variable pressure and
substantial variation in water distribution (with
deficits observed in higher parts, on sandy
soils, or at the ends of water distribution
lines). For example, secondary irrigation
networks were designed for 6 l/s flows,
but 9 or 12 l/s flow limiters were eventually
installed, after farmers complained. The
importance of stable pressure is illustrated by
farmers in the extreme north of the Jordan
Valley. Most of them shifted to micro-irrigation
systems after pressurization of the network
by the JVA in 1996 but they quickly reverted
to their previous system as the delivery
service did not match the design of the
collective network or their expectations
(Bourdin 2001). Finally, rotations are difficult
to establish and not adhered to; and water
theft and tampering of equipment are rampant
(GTZ 2004; MREA and JVA 2006). Farmers
relying on the same pumping stations are
extremely heterogeneous in terms of
socioeconomic status and low social
cohesion among them hinders collective
management (Van Aken 2004).
• Farmers also experience many technical
problems at the farm level that come from
microirrigation systems, such as installation
without technical guidance (in 70% of the
cases), direct connection of old pressurized
26 The JVA’s revenue has decreased in line with declining allotments from 1999 onwards. This may have prompted the proposal to
establish a monthly flat charge of 2 JD (US$2.8) on each water bill.
27 In fact, since 2005, the O&M costs of the JVA are totally covered by the sale of water from the Mujib Southern Carrier to the Dead Sea
industries. This recent change does not concern agricultural water use: it is not considered here and we keep conservative estimates.24
Box 1: Difficulties to Evaluate Irrigation Efficiency in the Jordan Valley
Because of the high diversity of situations, it is extremely complex to evaluate water use
efficiency in the Jordan Valley. Available data are inconsistent (World Bank 2002; Al-Zabet 2002;
Petitguyot 2003, etc.), and evaluations are variable, as they notably depend on features such
as the ones given below:
• The volume of water supplied in the Jordan Valley: aggregated JVA’s evaluations at the
pumping station, the Development Area (an administrative subunit), or the directorate levels
often differ from the centralized data obtained in Deir Allah (where the control centre of the
Jordan Valley network is located) or in Amman; the degree of consideration of other sources
of water, such as uncontrolled side-wadis, groundwater, etc.
• The values of ET and of Kc coefficients: uncertainties are high, notably when crops face water
stress (appendix 7) and when cropping techniques (drip and mulch, greenhouses) vary.
• The evaluation of rainfall and the degree of consideration of effective rainfall.
• The ‘unit of study’: a farm, an irrigation network, a pumping station, a Development Area, a
directorate, the whole Jordan Valley, etc.
• The evaluation of cultivated areas (different sets of data are available from the Ministry of
Agriculture; the JVA: at the farm, the pumping station, the directorate and the valley levels;
and satellite imagery analysis).
• The period considered: before or after 1999 (when quota reductions were initially
implemented); the whole year (lumping together periods when demand exceeds supply with
periods when supply exceeds demand); the period when water abstraction is effectively
sealed (see quotas in table 10); the cropping season, etc.
• The type of farm and the degree of intensification of farming.
• The type of crop cultivated and of irrigation technology used (surface irrigation or
microirrigation with microsprinklers, drippers or open tubes) by the farmers.
• The degree of consideration of special water requirements for specific operations such as land
preparation and ‘solarization’ and of occasional periods of deficit irrigation (Petitguyot 2003).
All these factors combined preclude a clear idea of what the actual irrigation efficiency is.
USAID (2006) cites studies that indicate that only 50 percent of the water received is effectively
applied and that “overall irrigation efficiencies might be as low as 40 percent.” A World Bank report
(2002) cites “evidence that over-irrigation takes place and water application practices are
out-dated,” while another report (World Bank 2001a) specifies that “irrigation conveyance and
distribution efficiency in the pressurized network in the Jordan Valley is high” and sees
“a considerable range to improve on-farm irrigation efficiency.” Other estimates at the country level
put irrigation efficiency at approximately 75 percent in areas irrigated with sprinklers and
85 percent in areas using drip irrigation techniques (Ghezawi and Dajani 1995). Furthermore,
Shatanawi et al. (2005) found that overall efficiency in the Jordan Valley was 65 percent.
Our macro-calculations based on land-use statistics (appendix 3), rainfall data (THKJ and
Meteorological Department 2002), assumption of a full ET, and volumes of water diverted by the
JVA to irrigated areas in the northern and middle directorates (calculations according to the new
quotas [see table 10] are consistent with volumes supplied as presented by the JVA-water
resources department in Amman), give the following annual efficiencies (defined as the ratio of
crop water requirements to water supply): 64, 62 and 82 percent for vegetables, citrus and
bananas, respectively. If the April–November period is considered, efficiencies rise to 88, 75 and
84 percent for the same crops. Overall efficiency in the Jordan Valley is included between
69 percent (if the whole year is considered) and 81 percent (if figures are only computed for the
April-November period).25
lines to the JVA’s pressurized network, poor
design of blocks and rotations, problems of
filtration and clogging, (Wolf et al. 1996;
Courcier and Guérin 2004; Shatanawi
et al. 2005).
• Unless saved water can be traded, the
economic incentive for the farmer to conserve
water will be insignificant (Development
Alternative 2004)—because the farmer cannot
use the water saved to expand cultivated
land, and more crucially, because of the
system of monthly quotas that defines a
ceiling to the abstraction of canal water by
the pumping stations. No savings are
possible during critical periods in spring and
autumn, because demand exceeds supply
(Petitguyot 2003; appendix 7) and the
marginal value of water far exceeds its
marginal cost (see the section ‘Economic
Impacts and Adjustments at the Farm level’).
During the rest of the year (November to
March), efficiency is lower as supply exceeds
demand, but this occurs at times when there
is no alternative use for water (and no
possibility of storage). Therefore, there is little
rationale or prospect for saving water. In
addition, the desirability of further water
savings is not fully established, as it is
feared that lower salt leaching would raise
salinity problems in the Jordan Valley
(McCornick et al. 2001). In the early 1990s,
for example, the JVA encouraged farmers to
take water free of charge in the winter
months for leaching purposes (Wolf et al.
1996). Furthermore, detailed observations in
citrus farms showed that trees could abstract
water from as deep as 1.50–2.50 m, thus
tapping part of the ‘excess’ supply that has
been stored in the ground during this surplus
period (Arrighi de Casanova 2007a).
• In most instances farmers are now billed
based on their quota and not on effective use,
either because the meter has been broken or
because the actual use indicated is
suspiciously low (i.e., under 75% of the quota,
in which case, the full quota is charged).
Adoption of Technology
Technological improvements can improve
irrigation efficiency. If pressure in the main
network is stabilized, or intermediate storage
(farm ponds) and individual pumps are available,
better on-farm irrigation is possible. Hence,
internal rotations can be redefined to better
balance pressure in the network, but this requires
technical assistance and capital. Farmers who
already adopted microirrigation in the past can
improve irrigation uniformity, but need to redesign
their network (mainly by installing larger
secondary pipes). In addition, they also need
improved filtration, more frequent renewal of
drippers and skilled operators. MREA and JVA
(2006) experiments have shown that improving
existing microirrigation systems would, on
average, cost $1,075, $1,330, $970, $1,435 per
hectare of citrus, bananas and vegetables in open
fields and under greenhouses, respectively
(e.g., annualized investments of about $205,
$224, $147 and $185 per year given the average
lifetime of the material). Investments could yield
added net revenues for these four crops of $430,
$1,460, $820, $650 per hectare (these average
values vary depending on the type of irrigation
technology—gravity, open tubes, micro-sprinklers
and drippers). These values were observed in
pilot projects under relatively controlled conditions
and, therefore, should be taken as upper limits.
Redesigning needs technical assistance (and
computer software to define blocks with a uniform
pressure), stressing the knowledge-intensive
nature of improving irrigation.
In citrus and banana orchards, a shift from
gravity irrigation (which still represents 30% of the
area and is mostly found in absentee-owner and
mixed farms) to microirrigation costs $1,400-2,400
and $2,900/ha for citrus and banana, respectively
(e.g., annualized investments of $263-462 and
$615/ha/yr), depending on the specifications, but
may yield additional average net revenues of
$850 and $425/ha/yr (amortization of investments
deducted)—(MREA and JVA 2006). If pressure is
not stabilized (in general, it will be too low for the
collective network to supply the amount of water
needed and as a result drippers will clog up more26
easily), farmers will have to invest an additional
$410/ha in a farm pond and a pump (especially if
they use microsprinklers; open tubes are less
sensitive to variation in pressure).
Three important points must be emphasized
here. First, this technological shift was financially
attractive (on paper) both before and after an
increase in water costs was made (and even
more so before than after). Therefore, increasing
water prices may push farmers to invest in
technology, with the possibility of increasing
income instead of incurring higher costs.
However, adoption is constrained by lack of
capital or credit as the costs of investing in
technology are sometimes higher than the
average annual net revenue (as shown for citrus
farms in table 5). Smaller, indebted farmers, or
ones without collateral, cannot easily access
credit and, therefore, stick to older simpler
production methods, or rent out their
land to commercial growers. Some urban
absentee-owners also have strategies adverse to
intensification (see later). Second, the increases
in net revenue, despite the investment costs,
stem from improved quality and better yield due
to better irrigation scheduling and uniformity, and
better control of nutrient status by ‘fertigation'
(applying fertilizer through drippers). As evidenced
in the gradual adoption of microirrigation from the
1970s to the 1990s,
28 it is the whole package of
intensification and higher-quality crop marketing
that pays for the technology and not the savings
in the water bill (since farmers use the same
quotas, regardless of the technology). Third,
better irrigation technology improves irrigation
efficiency (ET = [evapotranspiration]/farm supply),
not because the denominator (supply) is reduced
(quotas remain fully used: see above) but
because the numerator (ET) is increased, due to
a more homogenous distribution of water.
Crop Choice
Higher water charges, while reducing farmer net
revenues may also prompt shifts towards
low-water consuming crops and/or higher-value
crops (Pitman 2004; THKJ 2004). Economic data
(see next section) suggest that, as far as net
revenue per hectare is concerned, citrus (low
productivity) appear as undesirable when compared
with more profitable trees (mangoes, guava,
grapes and dates, which are becoming more
common in certain places of the Jordan Valley), or
with vegetables. Banana crops, although they yield
fair revenues could be replaced by other crops with
lower water requirements such as grapes and
dates. Yet, these options are already available
and, despite their apparent economic
attractiveness, farmers have opted for extensive
and less profitable systems.
Reasons that hinder intensification and
explain as to why everybody does not grow the
most profitable crops typically include
environmental constraints (soil type, salinity,
temperature, etc.), lack of skill or capital,
indebtedness, alternative economic activities,
ageing of the farm-holder, aversion to risk or
drudgery, etc., (for a review see Molle and
Berkoff [2007]). It is difficult for many farmers to
shift to riskier, more intensive, and time-/input-
consuming crops, unless relatively stable market
opportunities are available to them. Identification
of, and adaptation to, market demand and
requirements are key bottlenecks associated with
agriculture in Jordan (Salman 2001b; DOS and
FAO 2002; Al-Zabet 2002; Nachbaur 2004). Palm
trees, for example, are attractive because they
are salt-resistant and, in addition, their yield
(dates) fetches a high price in the market.
However, date production has several drawbacks
from the perspective of small-scale extensive
farmers. For example, date palms do not produce
28 Drip irrigation developed as a result of farm ponds allowing on-farm pressurization, and as a technical response to the need to
produce high-value products rather than to a lack of water per se. It was only one of the features of a larger technological package,
including black mulch, fertigation, controled doses of inputs, labor-saving technologies, greenhouses, etc.27
during a period of 5 years, post-harvest
operations are difficult to master, and only
high-quality products find their way to the most
profitable market niches. As with the adoption of
better irrigation technology, increased water
charges may induce farmers to intensify
production but does not reduce the constraints
themselves. What is provided is a ‘push'
incentive (run higher risk or face a loss in
income) rather than a ‘pull' incentive (an
opportunity that can be captured with little risk).
Moreover, many large citrus areas are owned
by absentee-owners whose livelihoods do not
depend on their agricultural activities. Their
orchards are linked to social prestige and
recreational use, and are not primarily driven by
economic motives (GTZ 1995; Lavergne 1996).
These owners may not shift to a more intensive
and time-consuming activity for the sake of
preserving their secondary agricultural revenue.
Another disincentive for farmers to shift from
citrus and banana trees to vegetables is the
resulting loss of their higher quota of water (with
little or no hope of obtaining it again if they ever
decide to revert to trees).
Land Rental
Since 2001, land market transactions have
been allowed in the Jordan Valley, but renting
plots had already become a widespread
practice. As land pressure in the Jordan Valley
is intense, farmers engaged in extensive
agriculture may cede their land to other farmers
who achieve higher profitability, either because
they have other occupations or because net
revenue falls below the land rent, which is
estimated at $570/ha/yr (Salman 2001b). Since
most farm managers are already tenants
(according to Salman [2001a], 87% of farm
managers in the Jordan Valley are tenants and
they farm 51% of the total area), the most
vulnerable of them may just give up agriculture.
Nothing ensures that economic alternatives are
available to them.
Others
Last, it is worth mentioning that pushing for much
higher water charges or curtailing quotas further
might lead farmers to respond by tampering with,
or destroying, meters, bribery, or defaulting
(Courcier and Guérin 2004; MREA and JVA 2006).
Indeed a great number of meters have now been
broken, in part as a response to the very costly
fine sanctioning illegal use of water. Unrest and
political interventions are also possible (and
likely) reactions, as shown by the case of the
bylaw on groundwater abstraction control (see
above) and more recently in the south of the
Jordan Valley, where the army had to intervene to
quell violent conflicts that erupted after the
government attempted to collect unpaid land and
water fees (Al-Hanbat 2007; Al-Arab al Yawm
2007 and Al-Dustour 2007). Such outcomes are
not attractive for the government, which has little
incentive to antagonize supportive segments of
the society if gains are not expected to be
substantial (Richards, 1993).
Economic Impacts and Adjustments at
the Farm Level
Based on the constraints and economic
considerations discussed above we evaluated
responses to increasing water prices in three
different scenarios. In Scenario A, we consider an
increase in water prices to a level where O&M
costs of the JVA can be recovered, as this is the
main objective of water pricing policies in Jordan
(THKJ and MWI 1998c, 2002a; FORWARD 1998;
Salman 2001a; THKJ et al. 2002; THKJ 2004). In
Scenario B, we consider a water price increase
that will allow the recovery of total costs of
irrigation in the Jordan Valley (O&M plus capital
costs). In these two scenarios, we consider that
the actual block-tariff system is maintained
(appendix 5). Scenario C is based on a
recommendation by THKJ (2004) according to
which prices in the Jordan Valley should be28
raised to 80 percent of the present average cost
of water borne by farmers in the Highlands.
29 In
this scenario, water is charged at a flat rate
($0.116/m
3 [Al-Hadidi 2002]) regardless of the
total water used in the farm.
We first analyze the financial impact of these
scenarios on the different farming systems,
assuming that farmers merely pay for the water
fee (situation [f]), everything else being equal
(including crop mix, irrigation efficiency and
delivered water). The rate of bill recovery is
assumed to be 100 percent. This potential impact
is then compared with the relative costs and
benefits, advantages and drawbacks, of other
options ([a] to [e], as presented above) in order to
evaluate farmers’ likely strategies. The analysis
of farmers’ decisions cannot be based on crop
budgets only. We must also consider both the a
priori positive financial incentives to adopt
improved technology or high-value crops, and the
factors that impede these changes (various types
of risk and alternative farmer-strategies). Although
such an analysis is contingent by nature, it
attempts to capture and incorporate the diversity
of farming systems, constraints and farmer
strategies. Table 11 specifies water costs for
each crop and scenario (considering that
farmers use their full quota), and table 12, the
financial impact of the three scenarios on each
farming system.
Water cost increases in scenarios A and B
correspond to multiplying current costs by a
factor of 1.4 and 4.15, respectively. In scenario
C, due to the implementation of a flat charge,
water costs are multiplied by 8.7 for vegetables,
by 8.5 for citrus, and by 5 for bananas. Table 12
shows that extensive farming systems (citrus and
mixed farms) would be most impacted because
water costs represent a large portion of total
costs (on citrus farms) and because their net
revenue is very low.
Scenario A would have a limited impact on
most farming systems in the Jordan Valley. Net
revenues on vegetable and banana farms would
decrease by less than 1 percent and 2 percent,
respectively. Mixed farms would also be slightly
affected by the increase (-2.6 %). Finally, citrus
farming systems would be the most affected—net
revenues would decrease by 4.2 percent to 13.2
percent in farms with micro-irrigation and gravity
farms, respectively. In the latter case, impact is
higher, but these absentee-owners are precisely
those who have other sources of revenue and
motivations and, therefore, are less sensitive to
changes in farm revenue. In sum, these impacts
are unlikely to significantly ‘tip’ farmers’ perception
of the constraints to intensification: the ‘push'
factor of declining revenues remains quite modest.
In scenario B, farm net revenues would
decline more substantially. Productive systems
29 “The water production cost from private wells borne by the farmers (at present about 14 cents/m³) should be taken as a guideline for
adjusting the water tariffs charged by the JVA (at present 1.5 to 2 cent/m³). The tariff for ‘public’ water of the JVA should not be lower
than 80 percent of the average cost of the water produced from private wells” (THKJ 2004).
TABLE 11.
Crop-based water costs according to three different levels of price increases.
Water costs (US$/ha/yr)* Vegetables Citrus Bananas
Current water costs 67 138 350
Scenario A. O&M costs recovery 94 192 485
Scenario B. Total costs recovery (O&M + capital costs) 278 573 1,454
Scenario C. 80% of water costs borne by farmers in the Highlands 586 1,172 1,740
Note: *Costs are calculated based on full quotas and average values for the on-demand period29
(vegetables in open fields or under greenhouses)
would again be slightly affected (net revenue
would decrease by about 2.8% to 5.5%), with
little change to be expected in current farming
strategies (limited on-farm water savings,
achieved by better management [response a],
and in a bid to decrease overall water costs,
might be observed). Mixed (poorer) farms would
be substantially affected (-20.1%). Since net
revenues come closer to the land rental value
($570/ha/yr), owners will increasingly rent out their
land, while tenants will progressively shift to other
jobs [response e], unless better market
opportunities and subsidies for modernization are
available to them. Shifting to micro-irrigation
(investment of $1,760 per ha) would offset their
loss and increase their actual revenue by more
than 40 percent (+$670/ha/yr), but this remains
hindered by the need of investments that are
higher than the net annual revenue of these
farmers (table 12).
The profitability of banana orchards would be
moderately affected (net revenues decrease by
8.8% to 15.8%). Some farmers will be ‘pushed’
to shift to other very profitable orchards, such
as date palm trees that are less water
consuming, but incentives will remain limited
unless import tariffs on bananas are lowered.
Such shifts to palm trees would concern only
the most capitalized and entrepreneurial farmers
(i.e., no more than 50%). As 50 percent of
bananas is still irrigated by gravity systems,
adoption of micro-irrigation offers a means of
limiting financial losses. Here the constraint is
not so much in terms of capital (investments of
2,900/ha compare favorably with annual
revenues of $7,000/ha) but the shift entails an
additional burden due to the complexity of
technology management (filtering, cleaning
drippers etc.), and only yields a limited benefit
(additional water costs of $1,100/ha would be
partly offset by the $425/ha/yr generated by the
higher yields obtained).
Finally, citrus farms would be greatly affected
(scenario B). The profitability of family farms
already using drip irrigation would decrease by
TABLE 12.
Impact of different levels of water price increases on farming systems in the Jordan Valley.
Citrus farms Banana farms Mixed farms
Farming systems Open-field Entrepreneurial Family Absentee- Family Entrepreneurial Poor
vegetable greenhouse farms*** owner and farms farms family
family farms farms family farms farmers
Allocation type Vegetables Vegetables Citrus Citrus Bananas Bananas Vegetables
Net revenue* 3,800    7,500 1,250    400 7,000 12,500 1,050
(US$/ha/yr)
Production costs** 8,150 21,000 1,550 1,200 8,200    8,600 2,400
(US$/ha/yr)
Actual water costs 1.8 <1 11  34.5 5 2.8 6.4
(% of net revenue)
Actual water costs <1 <1 8.9 11.5 4.3 4.1 2.8
(% of total costs)
Decrease Scenario A <1 <1 4.2 13.2 1.9 1.1 2.6
in net
revenue
(% of Scenario B 5.5 2.8 34.8 negative 15.8 8.8 20.1
actual revenue
net
revenue) Scenario C 13.6 6.9 82.7 negative 19.8 11.1 49.4
revenue
Note: *, **, *** As in table 230
one-third. Family farms include many small
owners who are likely to improve design,
equipment and management along the lines
defined earlier, with investments of $1,075/ha
(close to the actual revenue) but with a yearly
additional revenue of $430/ha/yr, which will almost
cover additional water costs ($435/ha/yr).
Citrus farmers still using gravity irrigation
(70% of whom have family farms, including
shopkeepers, civil servants, retirees, old farmers,
widows, etc.), will see their revenue become
negative. They will thus have a strong incentive
to capture the gains from a shift to
microirrigation, with net revenues increasing from
$400 to $815/ha instead of becoming negative (if
response [f] is selected—table 12); yet this
demands a high initial investment (equivalent to
more than 3 years of annual revenue), which is a
constraining factor for many of these farmers,
especially if there is no proper financial scheme
or support. Financial incentives will be the same
for rich absentee-owners (with gravity irrigation),
but they are more likely to accept losses,
depending on their preference for criteria of
leisure and prestige, and for non labor-intensive
agriculture (GTZ 1995; Lavergne 1996; Venot et
al. 2007).
30
Farmers face the same a priori positive
incentive to diversify into other fruit trees, since
fruits like dates, mangoes, guava or grapes are
more profitable than citrus. Again, the incentives
to adopt improved technology or higher-value
trees largely depend on the will/capacity of the
farmers to intensify and on the availability of
stable market opportunities. If their perception of
risk and drudgery or their capital constraints
remain too high, they will opt to rent out their land
to investors. In both farms (irrigated by gravity or
by drippers), increasing water prices would thus
work to increase economic efficiency.
Finally, scenario C would have a dramatic
impact on agriculture in the Jordan Valley. As in
the two previous scenarios, citrus orchards
profitability would be dramatically entailed and
most orchards would be replaced in one of the
ways described above. In capitalized banana
farms, a partial shift to date palm and other
trees, and the use of more efficient drip irrigation
systems might be observed. Nevertheless, the
likelihood of losing the higher quota will certainly
remain an impediment to this evolution. Mixed
farm operators would see their profitability
decrease by half and, as such, would rent out
their land. Tenants, if they have the financial
capacity, will run the risk to intensify or will be
replaced by more entrepreneurial farmers. The
profitability of greenhouses would decrease by
6.9 percent, but farmers would have to withstand
the pressure due to the lack of cost-effective
alternatives (MREA and JVA 2006). In the case
of open field vegetable farms, farmers would
lose 13.6 percent of their revenue, and would
consider improving water application (response
[a]) or adopting improved irrigation systems
(response [b]). These responses would offset the
losses due to higher water costs and increase
revenues by 11 percent. Further intensifying
agriculture by adopting greenhouses ($25,000/ha
for the greenhouse only) is unlikely to be
observed on a large scale, due to the critical
capital and environmental constraints linked to
the process. This third scenario is hardly
imaginable since it would disrupt the economy of
Jordan Valley and exacerbate the political
protests that, in the past, have erupted for less
serious policy changes (e.g., above).
Incentives provided by high water prices are,
therefore, likely to influence technological change
and crop mix, and to lead to a higher water
productivity. We have earlier discarded the
possibility of significant water savings under the
present monthly quota system because the
marginal value of water is too high in the critical
period (April-November), while there is no
alternative use when supply exceeds demand.
This marginal value depends on the crop and on
30 Many of those farmers have, for example, refused heavily subsidised systems in MREA’s pilot areas (Arrighi de Casanova 2007b): in
a context of suspicion regarding future government regulations, farmers do not want outsiders to meddle in their farm activities (see
also Van Aken 2004).31
its physiological stage, but in this critical period,
which generally includes flowering and/or fruit
formation, it is higher than the average water
productivity, which is itself an order of magnitude
higher than the marginal cost of water.
This remains true for all crops in scenarios A
and B, with one exception, i.e., gravity irrigation of
citrus farms under scenario B. In this particular
case, the average water productivity (0.04 cents/
m
3) is slightly lower than average water costs
(0.057 cents/m
3). In the critical period, the marginal
cost of water is 0.071 cent/m
3 (for the second tier
in the block tariff), but its marginal value is much
higher than the average. Water stress at flowering
and fruit formation stages has very severe impacts
on yields (Arrighi de Casanova, 2007b) and the
marginal value of water during this period is
indicated by the level of bribes paid for illegal
water at such times, which can be 10 times higher
than the marginal cost of water. During the on-
demand period, however, the marginal cost is
$0.047 /m
3 (first tier), close to the average water
productivity, pointing to possible cost-effective
water savings over 2,400 hectares of citrus. These
savings are minor.
Alternatives to Reduce Freshwater
Diversion for Jordan Valley Agriculture
In conclusion, the scope for achieving gains in
irrigation and economic efficiency through price
incentives is limited. Gains are possible, but their
magnitude and realization depend on the type of
farm, and they cannot be obtained without
support, including technical assistance,
predictable water supply, secure markets, and
subsidies to shift to drip-irrigation (where this has
not yet happened) and, gradually, to precision
irrigation. Several additional options have been
proposed to limit freshwater diversion for
agriculture in the Jordan Valley, including:
• Flexibility of water supply at the farm level is
obtained not only through exceptional
requests (e.g., land preparation for potatoes
and solarization for vegetables), but also by
digging farm ponds to buffer irregular supply
(more than half of the farmers have on-farm
reservoirs [Shatanawi et al. 2005]), by using
water from side-wadis and, wherever possible,
by pumping groundwater that is partly
replenished by ‘losses’ from the surface
irrigation networks (21.7 Mm
3 are presently
pumped for agricultural purposes, mostly in
the south of the Jordan Valley [MWI-records
for the year 2004]). Many farmers already
have implemented these options.
• Effective freshwater savings in the Jordan
Valley may come from greater use of treated
wastewater blended with freshwater in the
north of the Jordan Valley, as proposed by
ARD and USAID (2001b)—(see also
Al-Jayyousi 2001; McCornick et al. 2002, and
KfW et al. 2006).
• Significant water savings could be achieved
through a better in-season distribution of water
in the King Abdullah Canal. With the
completion of the Wehdah Dam on the
Yarmouk River (which will provide upstream
storage capacity), it will be possible to have a
more flexible management of water allowances
and a substantially increased economic output
(Al-Jayyousi 2001; Salman et al. 2001; Shaner
2001; Courcier and Guérin 2004). Monthly
quotas could be transformed to yearly quotas,
with farmers keeping the latitude to distribute
water along the year according to their needs
(Petitguyot 2003). Eventually, with increased
control on individual consumption, quotas
could be made transferable, thus providing real
financial incentives for technical and economic
gains (Development Alternative 2004).
• With a more controlled water regime, an
alternative would be to adopt bulk allocation
and bulk charging procedures, whereby water
user associations (WUA) would be in charge
of managing a yearly amount of water and
recovering charges (JRVIP 2001). This,
however, is hindered by extant cultural and
social structures and, as such, would require
significant institutional transformations and
changes in the agency (JVA)-farmer
relationship (Van Aken 2004).32
• The banana area could be reduced by
substantially raising the price of the higher
tiers of the quota, so that revenues of banana
farmers would be reduced without affecting
other crops. Banana farming could also be
made less profitable by removing duties on
imported bananas, in line with World Trade
Organization rules (WTO 1999; Montigaud et
al. 2006).
31 Such economic incentives could
be quite effective in inducing a shift towards
other trees and a full conversion to drippers,
but the capital constraint and the potential
loss of high banana allowances act as
impediments to this evolution.
• The most efficient way to reduce diversions
to the Jordan Valley (and to free more water
for Amman) would be to gradually reduce the
quotas to force adjustments—high-tech
management, change in crops, etc. Yet, this
has already been the case since 1998, with
effective supply in the last 9 years varying
between 50 and 80 percent of theoretical
entitlements and crops facing water deficits
during some periods of the year (MREA and
JVA 2006). Additionally, a bonus might be
granted to those who accept to shift from a
high tree quota to the vegetable quota
(provided proper market opportunities for
vegetables are ensured). This, of course,
would be hard to justify in the face of the
recent contradictory measure of recognizing
more citrus allowances. For the sake of
illustration, we can estimate what would
happen if half the banana area was replaced
by date palm trees (eligible to the citrus
allocation) and a third of the present citrus
area was replaced by vegetables. According
to the quotas summarized in table 10, this
shift would reduce agriculture freshwater
diversion by about 14.3 Mm
3/yr, that is
around 12 percent of the water released to
the northern and middle directorates between
1999 and 2002.
• Last, both irrigation and economic efficiency
can be enhanced by conventional positive
incentives that affect the environment in
which farmers take decisions to invest and
intensify. Aside from the already mentioned
technical and institutional interventions aimed
at stabilizing pressure in collective networks
and redesigning on-farm distribution, other
positive incentives include: a) attractive
output markets; b) crop insurance schemes
for farmers tempted to diversify; c) subsidies
to shift to well-designed drip-irrigation (where
this has not yet happened); and d) gradually,
move on to precision irrigation (see below). In
practice, because pricing reforms often affect
extensive family-based farming, concomitant
state support to intensification or
modernization is widely observed (Molle and
Berkoff 2007).
31 Despite adhesion to the WTO, the government realized that there was little value in competing with other countries not abiding by
the same rules (e.g., in Israel, agriculture is heavily subsidised; see Richards 1993). Jordan has to face “unfair market intrusions by
countries with less stringent WTO membership conditions.” For example, Jordan’s decision makers realized that “the rapid decrease of
tariff rates for olive oil, and the absence of the possibility to apply ‘special safeguard measures’, could lead to the abandonment of a
great number of farms, increase desertification, create social unrest and considerable migration to towns” (WTO 2001).33
Discussion and Prospects
This section recaps the conclusions of the above
sections: results obtained in the Highlands and in
the Jordan Valley bear both similarities and
discrepancies. It also expands the discussion in
relation to a wider socio-political and economic
context, in which water policies in general, and
pricing policies in particular, are embedded.
Although frequently disregarded, these
dimensions often determine much of what is
eventually possible and desirable (Dinar and
Saleth 2005; Molle and Berkoff 2007). The results
obtained in both the Highlands and the Jordan
Valley bear several similarities, and also bring
lessons that have wider validity.
Limited Effectiveness for Pricing Mechanisms to
Achieve Improvements in Irrigation Efficiency
and Water Savings: Several studies based on
modeling (Shatanawi and Salman 2002; Doppler
et al. 2002; Salman et al. 2005 [for the Jordan
Valley]; Salman et al. 2002; Salman and
Al-Karablieh 2004 [for the Highlands]) have
shown that demand is responsive to prices at
levels which are, in general, not compatible with
sustained farm incomes and equity. We have
also stressed that suboptimal irrigation efficiency
is primarily linked to unstable pressure in
collective pressurized networks (in the Jordan
Valley), which makes the functioning of poorly
designed on-farm distribution networks
precarious. These on-farm networks are subject
to many technical problems (notably clogging of
‘emitters’, non-uniformity of water application,
non-optimized blocks and rotations). In the
Jordan Valley, another source of inefficiency
(independent from farmers) is the lack of storage
capacity at the system level for the excess
water during the time of year when ‘supply’
exceeds ‘demand’ (although extra water is used
for soil leaching, and there are indications that
the soil acts as a buffer reservoir for citrus).
With such water having no alternative use, and
with irrigation controlled by strict quotas when
demand exceeds supply, possible water savings
are limited.
Consequently, the claim by the 2004
Masterplan (THKJ 2004) that the full cost
recovery for irrigation O&M pursued by the
Ministry of Water and Irrigation will, among four
objectives, “increase the conveyance system and
on-farm water use efficiency” is not valid. From
the correct assumption that “low prices for
irrigation water provide limited incentive to
improve on-farm efficiencies,” and it is too hastily
inferred that raising prices will automatically
improve on-farm efficiency and should, therefore,
be “a prime target for implementing
improvements” (USAID 2006). A World Bank
(2003) report indeed acknowledges that “it was
anticipated that increased water tariffs [of 1996]
would reduce agricultural water use. This did not
happen.” Despite evidence to the contrary, these
claims are still pervasive among donors,
development banks, and some green NGOs,
which support the “gradual removal of all
subsidies on water supplied to agriculture, tourism
and industry sectors” and the setting up of water
prices “on the market price basis” (FOE 2002).
Such removal may have other virtues but should
not be expected to bring about improvements in
irrigation efficiency (nor be justified by this).
Intensifying Agriculture: At What Cost? With
limited scope for achieving water savings,
farmers will potentially respond to increasing
water costs by intensification. In intensive and
profitable systems (vegetable and greenhouse
farms) water costs are negligible compared to
input and labor costs, and they will remain so at
any politically acceptable water price level (Wolf
et al. 1996). Farms with more extensive
agricultural strategies will be more affected,
including primarily: 1) mixed farms (often poor/
indebted) and small orchards of citrus or banana
in the Jordan Valley (Salman [2001a] and Van
Aken [2004] underline that indebtedness and
vulnerability are two major problems hindering the
progress of agriculture in the Jordan Valley);
2) extensive open field vegetable farms in the
Highlands and; 3) absentee-urban-owners and34
rentiers with other sources of revenue (citrus and
olive trees plantations). Price-induced pressure
would have a beneficial impact, if these farmers
were to adopt improved technology and
higher-value crops. As noted earlier, these options
were already available to these farmers and there
are sound reasons why—despite their high return
on paper—they did not adopt them earlier.
Farmers engaged in extensive agriculture are
often indebted (or weary to be so) or lack capital
to embrace such ventures that incur considerable
risk. In the case of rentiers, they lack the interest
to burden themselves with intensive management
and value their farm for other reasons.
Intensification should be driven by market
opportunities and not forced by circumstances.
The latter would initially make farmers financially
more vulnerable and then push them into risky
ventures with a higher probability of going
bankrupt (see Doppler et al. 2002 for the
prevalence of risk in the Jordan Valley). It is
doubtful whether the benefits of pushing the more
vulnerable farmers out of business would
outweigh the social costs incurred.
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Allocating water rights to all farmers and
allowing them to be traded, as envisioned in the
ASAL, could also lead to the same outcome, with
the notable difference that poorer farmers (when
the land or the well is owned by them) would get
appropriate financial compensation. Whether such
evolutions are desirable and pursued or not,
depends on the context and on the overall
policies of a given country. Most countries are
confronted with this necessity of balancing
family-farming and agro-business, social stability
and economic efficiency. For example, recent
simulation of the response of European
agriculture to the European Water Directive
Framework showed a need for a distinction
between ‘socially driven irrigation’ and
‘commercial systems’, because of the expected
dramatic impact of pricing policies on the former
(Berbel et al. 2005; see also the case of Spain in
Arrojo 2001). As a rule, state policies include
investments/subsidies in order to allow
modernization of family farms, with the objective
of enabling them to better compete with highly
capitalized operators.
Increasing Economic Efficiency: High-Value
Crops, for Which Market? The move towards a
more intensive and higher-value agriculture is
critically dependent on the availability of a market
for it. With growing competition from other
countries in the Middle East, identifying crops
with a good return and limited risk is not easy.
Hence, it has become a policy priority (Montigaud
et al. 2006; Nachbaur 2004; Salman 2001b). With
adequate support to intensification and marketing,
water price increases thus have the potential to
raise economic efficiency by inducing changes in
citrus and banana cultivation. Likewise, economic
benefits arise from small farmers renting out their
plot to investors growing higher value crops, but
these farmers must find alternative occupations
or incomes.
The Politics of Water Management and Policy:
Water pricing schemes largely reflect the political
economy of a country, and political
counterweights are often raised when prices
depress revenues.
The negotiations around the bylaw and the
amendment, carried out with a fair degree of
participation of stakeholders (Chebaane et al.
2004), showed that agricultural interests retain
significant political and bargaining power—the
government is unwilling to alienate the support of
Bedouin tribes or part of the Palestinian
population, and to prompt claims from Islamist
radicals that Islamic law is violated (Richards
1993). The teeth of the bylaw were removed
through the implicit abolition of former abstraction
limits (which were lower than the 150,000 m
3
threshold adopted) and through the recent
32 “Indeed, a senior government official stated that the net cost (US$3.5 million per year) of providing water to the Jordan Valley, which
enabled sustainable livelihoods for the 300,000 people engaged in agriculture, was relatively small compared with the social costs
that would be incurred if very high water charges caused farmers to abandon the land and migrate to Amman for employment”
(Pitman 2004).35
amendment, which abated the already low water
fees. Some groups of influential farmers, with
strong political linkages and opposed to a control
of water abstraction, have tried to stop the
process. They have succeeded in slowing it down
through some support in the parliament. The
bylaw has not been implemented yet (as shown
by the fact that the bills for the first year have
not been paid yet) and it remains a very sensitive
and volatile issue.
The fact that illegal citrus orchards
in the Jordan Valley have been regularized
recently —quite in contradiction with policy
objectives—also suggests that the populations
concerned have enough political influence to
counter the reduction of quotas. This does not
mean that reforms are not desirable or should not
be attempted, but it reminds us that reform costs,
and not only benefits, must be carefully
anticipated (Dinar and Saleth 2005). The high
percentage of broken meters, for example,
reminds us that fees which significantly affect the
economic situation of farms and/or quotas that
are too low tend to trigger defaulting, tampering or
destruction of meters, social unrest and political
stress, and corruption or collusion between
officials and farmers (GTZ 2004; Courcier and
Guérin 2004). Such outcomes are not attractive
for the government, which has little incentive to
antagonize supportive segments of the society if
gains are not expected to be substantial
(Richards 1993).
Recovering O&M Costs in the Valley is Possible:
The above analysis indicates that the prime
objective of financial autonomy of the JVA is
attainable. Charges could be slightly raised to
ensure revenue, while defaulting should be
controlled by stricter enforcement. Raising prices
to fully recover O&M costs would not dramatically
affect farmers. From the point of view of the
state, such recovery is very important in terms of
fiscal discipline but less so in absolute
terms—the ‘fiscal drain’ argument commonly
raised to justify increased cost-recovery is hardly
convincing since the present O&M subsidy to the
JVA is worth less than 0.1 percent of state
expenditures given at $3.7 billion (Jreisat 2005).
Yet, despite higher coverage of state-borne
O&M costs, water charges do not instill any
virtuous circle towards improved management and
maintenance on both the manager and farmer
sides (Small and Carruthers 1991; Easter and Liu
2005; Molle and Berkoff 2007). There is a lack of
positive incentive stemming from the fact, that
charges paid by farmers are not benefiting the
scheme, managers do not depend on these
payments (which are sent to the Ministry of
Finance), farmers control neither part of the
revenue nor water deliveries, supply is uncertain,
and allocation not transparent enough. Under
such conditions water pricing merely boils down
to a taxation instrument. Bulk charging at the
pumping station level and transferring
responsibility for charging farmers individually to
water user association, might be a way forward.
It is unlikely that raising fees much beyond
the O&M cost recovery level can be tenable,
because of the limited effect it will have on water
use. In addition, raising charges above JVA’s
expenditures would be difficult to justify since it
would look like a transfer of wealth to the state.
These factors and the fact that instances of full
cost recovery of public schemes in the world are
scarce make scenario B unlikely, not to mention
scenario C.
Improving Allocation of Water Resources: With
price increases expected to have only minimal
impact on water efficiency, the objective of
reducing agricultural demand to sustainable levels
in the Highland and to volumes lower than current
diversions in the Jordan Valley through pricing
mechanisms, is clearly unattainable and must be
dismissed, in line with Berkoff (1994), who
recognized “that it is inconceivable that (charges)
would be high enough to balance supply and
demand.” Under such circumstances, the higher-
level objective of regulating intersectoral
allocation through prices, expressed in the ASAL
despite considerable doubt from experts (Pitman
2004), is also unrealistic, a conclusion now widely
recognized as generic (Bosworth et al. 2002;
World Bank 2003b; Dinar and Saleth 2005).
That “the partial tariff increase (in the Jordan
Valley) satisfied an immediate objective of36
maximizing transfer of water to the Highlands”
(World Bank, 2003a), is also unfounded since this
transfer is a bureaucratic decision and completely
independent of prices. Transfer has been
continuously increasing and effective, and it is
expected that in the future most of the Jordan
Valley will be irrigated with treated wastewater
only (McCornick et al. 2002). Rather, reallocation
has been made possible by curtailing water use
in the Jordan Valley through quotas.
State and Donors: Conflicting Viewpoints:
Opposition to pricing by most quarters in the
government is based on three considerations
(Pitman 2004): a) social concerns and the view
that farmers’ access to groundwater is already
too costly; b) the view that administrative
allocation of surface water and technical/
institutional improvements in management are
more efficient and equitable than pricing, in
achieving sound management; and c) the
understanding that alternative markets must be
ensured before pushing farmers to abandon
lower-value crops. With some caveats this study
tends to confirm these misgivings.
Pitman (2004) notes that the “social-welfare
dimension of water was the largest divergence of
views between the Bank and the Government over
the agricultural sector” and soured relationship
between them. The possible impacts on poorer
farmers have made the policymakers in Jordan
more concerned with the potential social (and
political) costs of reforms. Since arguments
supporting reallocation of water to richer farmers
are clearly not supported by decision makers (who
dismiss them as “not valid, since it will result in
the monopoly of big farmers in agriculture,”), it is
not clear why funding partners are adamant to
impose their view in that respect. A possible
source of misunderstanding is that affected people
include both poor farmers and rentiers, and that
the former might be used to unduly shelter the
latter from adverse policy measures.
Safety Nets: Policymakers’ misgivings may be
well-founded if one judges from experience in
other domains where planned safety nets have
been neglected, equity impaired, and social
objectives defeated. For example, the elimination
of all direct subsidies to owners of small
livestock herds over the period 1995–1997 proved
to be very effective in reducing herd sizes by 25
to 50 percent, overgrazing and thereby rangeland
degradation and desertification. However, an
official evaluation found that “the poorest group
—nomadic pastoralists—in the driest areas have
fared worst as they do not have the income to
buy even subsidized concentrates. All farmers
monitored, with the exception of the medium-
sized agro-pastoral farmers in the wettest areas
in 1997/98, had negative profits since 1996”
(Pitman 2004). Earlier consensus that ‘attendant
measures would be needed’ seems to have been
later forgotten (Richards 1993).
This suggests that too little attention is
given to safety nets, and the assumption that
people can be reabsorbed by the labor market
without much hardship, is often not valid.
Clearly, linkages to the macroeconomic
framework must be strengthened if social
objectives are to be fulfilled.
From Negative to Positive Incentives: Generally,
negative incentives through pricing that deplete
incomes or force costly/risky adjustments raise
considerable opposition. This dissatisfaction may
be expressed through political channels or in the
streets. Such (stick) measures should be linked
to positive incentives (carrot)—(Al-Weshah 2000).
Positive incentives include a bonus for uprooting
olive trees in the Highlands or accepting
vegetable allowances in the Jordan Valley (or tree
allowances for banana growers), attractive buy-out
schemes of wells in the Highlands, aid or crop
insurance schemes for farmers willing to diversify,
etc. Likewise, the government’s reluctance to
raise prices before treated wastewater or market
opportunities are available also indicates the fear
of negative impacts in the absence of clear
alternative opportunities and ‘pull’ factors.
Enforcement and Monitoring: It is clear in both
situations that individual metering is extremely
demanding and hard to administrate. The
percentage of broken meters both in the
Highlands and in the Jordan Valley is likely to37
rise again after replacement campaigns. If fees
significantly affect the economic situation of
farms they will also probably trigger defaulting,
tampering or destruction of meters, social unrest
and political stress at unprecedented levels.
The implementation of the bylaw will also
need a dramatic increase in both human and
technical resources to control, protect and repair
water meters (two expensive measures). These
measures might come at a state’s expense,
eventually. Corruption and collusion between
officials and farmers will also develop and be
hard to control, especially in a context where the
former are underpaid and some of the latter
being socially influential (GTZ 2004). This does
not mean that metering should not be
implemented, but reminds us of the costs
involved in the process and of the possibility of
adopting other approaches (e.g., charges based
on crop and area in the Highlands, or defined
and recovered at the level of the pumping
station in the Jordan Valley).
Quotas and Regulation: As shown from other
situations where scarcity is high and volumetric
control possible (Iran, Tunisia, Morocco, south of
France, Italy, Spain, Australia, United States or
the present case), quotas are invariably selected
as the main regulation instrument, with prices
controlling use beyond the quota when on-demand
service is technically possible (Molle and Berkoff
2007). This is because quotas are, in general,
transparent, equitable, easy to understand, and
effective in reducing diversions without creating
much of an impact on incomes—they have less
impact on total revenue than price-based
regulation (where some farmers have to be
‘priced-out’ until demand equates supply). Their
application on wells, however, requires a major
enforcement capacity. Their main drawback is the
limited capacity to adjust to changes in demand.
The present case provides such an example,
where economic inefficiencies arise from the
disincentive they generate for citrus and banana
growers to adopt less water-intensive crops. In
the absence of adequate conditions for quota
transactions between users, careful downward
adjustments of quotas, as implemented in the
Jordan Valley since 1999, are effective in forcing
adjustments and saving water (however, the
margin of flexibility for farmers is reduced, and
the great diversity of efficiencies implies that
some farms might be adversely affected by such
a curtailment).
Highlands and Jordan Valley: Some Meaningful
Discrepancies: Although the two situations show
many commonalities, the comparison also
manifested a few meaningful discrepancies, which
are given below:
First, is the possibility offered to ‘highlanders’
to expand their plots of land. This allows them to
capitalize on possible water savings and to
increase the cultivated areas (and benefits) in
proportion. Economic gains from improved
irrigation efficiency are not derived from uncertain
increases in yields only, as was the case in the
Jordan Valley. It is more interesting for
‘highlanders’ to improve efficiency than for
farmers in the Jordan Valley.
Second, quotas in the Highlands are merely
thresholds, which can be exceeded at limited
cost, while those in the Jordan Valley are rigid
and cap diversions (although informal
arrangements may offer some way out).
Third, water supply in the Highland is very
reliable, because it depends on individual wells
and compact networks. In contrast, allocation
and distribution in the Jordan Valley are much
more complex both technically (regulation of the
KAC, rotation between farmers within
pressurized networks, etc.,) and socially
(practices are embedded in complex social and
political contexts). This difference explains why
water efficiencies are higher in the Highlands
(with the additional benefit that return flows tend
to return to the aquifer, while in the Jordan
Valley, they mostly go to a sink— the Dead
Sea). In sum, water management is technically
simpler in the Highlands, but enforcement and
control are problematic. In the case of the
Jordan Valley, the opposite is true, where quotas
are effective in controlling water use but
management heterogeneous, which makes it
difficult to achieve uniformity in water distribution
and efficiencies.38
Conclusion
We can conclude that some, but not all, of the
benefits expected from water pricing policies
could materialize in the Lower Jordan River
Basin. On the positive side, in the Jordan Valley,
we showed that full cost-recovery of O&M is
achievable without major impacts on revenues,
but the virtual link between payment and
improved service should be activated by granting
more financial autonomy to the JVA. More
substantial increases in water prices and lowering
of the current quotas (in both the Jordan Valley
and the Highlands) can also be expected to raise
overall economic efficiency by pushing farmers to
intensify and invest in technology, or to rent out
their land to investors (greenhouses or fruit-tree
farmers). As for the farmers growing bananas,
this incentive will be increased if import duties
are removed.
However, it is clear that there is pervasive
over-optimism among donors, development banks
and some green NGOs about what can be
achieved through pricing policies, and that policy
objectives are often listed without due attention to
the contradictions they entail, the trade-offs they
imply and the constraints they face. Expectations
of the ASAL, for example, were high but the
goals of economic efficiency, equity and
environmental sustainability (central to the
definition of Integrated Water Resource
Management) are not easily reconciled. In the
Jordan Valley, the current system of quotas, the
lack of storage, and the technical difficulties
experienced in the pressurized networks indicate
that little water can be saved. Irrigation efficiency
is improved by technical interventions that ensure
better uniformity and better timing of water
applications, which in turn enhance ET (and
yields), and not by merely reducing water use.
Real savings will be possible, if monthly quotas
can be turned into one annual quota (in such
conditions, possibility of trading water would also
enhance both irrigation and economic efficiency,
but control of supply is yet far from sufficient to
allow such mechanisms to be put in place). In
the Highlands, in line with worldwide experience,
which shows that individual use of groundwater
is extremely difficult to regulate, the objective of
reducing abstraction to sustainable levels
through the bylaw will not be met, partly
because: a) high quotas will do little to regulate
water use in under-irrigated rentier’s farms (olive
orchards); and b) water cost increases will
remain modest compared to the high revenues
of fruit tree entrepreneurs.
Finally, it is clear that negative price
incentives would further depress the revenue of
the most extensive farmers (citrus orchards,
mixed farms in the Jordan Valley and open field
vegetable farms in the Highlands) and force them
to reconsider the benefits of crops/technology
shifts and the risks and constraints that are
associated with the choices. Yet, this
reconsideration will be practically enforced on
them in a situation of greater financial
vulnerability (because of loss in revenue due to
higher water costs), which in turn would increase
the financial risk linked with such choices. A shift
towards high-value crops would not only raise
water productivity but also entail a transfer of
wealth to the government and to wealthier
entrepreneurs, an evolution that has thus far not
been considered as desirable or politically
palatable by Jordanian decision makers. Hence,
price incentives should not be imposed on
farmers, unless accompanied with positive
incentives that reduce capital and risk
constraints, offer attractive alternatives (market
options, subsidies for modernization, technical




Details of Farming System Characterization
Farming Systems in the Highlands
Settled Bedouins
Nomadic Bedouins settled down in the eastern
deserts during the 1970s, 1980s and even
1990s. Following governmental settlement
policies, they partly gave up their livestock
activity. Farmers can either be landowners or
lessees, but in all cases the household
partiipates in the farm work. Three main farming
systems are identified below:
Vegetables in Open Fields: A Family Farming
System: These farming systems are developed
by Bedouins who settled down in the region in the
1980s and partially gave up livestock activity.
They rent both the well they use to irrigate and
the land they crop. Farmers always ensure they
cultivate the maximum area (on average 20 to 25
ha) that can be irrigated as per the quantity of
water they can pump from the well they rent.
Most of the time, farming is a family-based
activity—half of the work is usually done by the
tenant’s family (4 to 8 workers), the other half by
permanent employees, supplemented by daily
workers, when required.
In these regions, there is not much ‘land
pressure’, and, as such, most farmers freely
change the plots they crop every year to avoid
land degradation (salinization, contamination by
fungi or nematodes, etc.,). The crops grown are
much varied— tomato and watermelon principally,
followed by pepper, zucchini, cabbage and
cauliflower. Of the two cropping seasons, one is
in the spring (from March to July) and the other is
in the summer (from August to October/
November).
These systems have a low profitability. The
net benefit per hectare averages $1,100 and the
net income per family worker is lower than
$2,500/capita/year: the household lives below
the poverty line (evaluated at $660/ca/yr by the
Jordanian Government, the DFIP and the
UNDP).
Mixed Farms: A Family Farming System:
Generally, there are two main plots, contiguous or
otherwise: vegetables are cropped on 20 to 25
hectares and there is an olive orchard on 10 to
15 hectares (with, at times, other fruit trees such
as peach and nectarine). If the plots planted with
vegetables and olive trees are distant from each
other, the farmer will often own two wells
(otherwise, the orchard will be supplied with water
from the well meant for watering vegetables). As
the family continues part of its livestock activity
it is not rare to see small herds (50 heads, goats
and sheep) grazing in the vicinity of the farm.
Cereals (wheat and barley) are often grown for the
animals. The household, therefore, may have
sources of revenue other than agriculture.
The cropping systems themselves are similar
to those of the extensive open-field farms
described above, but watermelon is less common
(owing to its high consumption of fertilizer/
chemical, risk of soil contamination). Farm
profitability, however, is low, with a net income
averaging $800/ha of vegetables. The olive
orchard is managed by the family (harvest is a
traditional family gathering, sometimes done with
the help of daily workers) and its profitability
reaches (for trees at maturity) $300/ha/year,
significantly increasing the agricultural revenue of
the family. With such increases, the total average
revenue amounts to $621/ha/year.
Since agricultural activities usually do not
provide revenues higher than the poverty line,
farmers, more often that not, are compelled to
rely on other sources of revenue that are
derived from the wider economy.
Family Fruit-tree Farms: A Family Farming
System: When profitability of vegetable farming
decreased during the 1980s and the beginning of
the 1990s, some Bedouins (owners) shifted to
fruit-tree plantations, especially those who had
the investment capacity to do so. They now
manage an orchard of 10 to 20 hectares on
average and have retained their olive plots (and42
sometimes, though rarely, a small area planted
with vegetables). This shift is still observed today
resulting in vegetable cultivation giving way to
fruit-tree farming. However, the household
continues to retain a small herd. Farmers today,
essentially have peach and nectarine trees.
Although the initial investment for this system is
high (nearly $29,000/ha), its net benefit reaches
about $6,900/ha/yr.
Stone-fruit Tree Entrepreneurs
Stone-fruit production is still an expanding
profitable activity in the Highlands, despite
difficult regional and economic conditions. Large
entrepreneurs continue to invest in orchards: they
rent or purchase wells and land that is often
abandoned by vegetable farmers during the last
10 years and engage in high/long-term
investments to grow intensively managed and
profitable orchards.
Generally, the owner’s family is in charge of
the management of the farm, the owner being
referred to as a Muzakhein. In most cases, the
family is of Palestinian descent and owns
between 20 and 300 hectares. The owner of the
farm is highly involved in commercialization and
marketing of the product, while a caretaker (who
often belongs to the owner’s family) manages
qualified permanent employees and takes care of
day-to-day operations. Two main management
types can be identified:
Very Intensively Managed Farming Systems with
High-tech Irrigation Techniques: The owner is
very closely involved in farm activities, the initial
investments are very high ($600,000 to 700,000
for the area served by one well: 20 to 40 ha), a
large part of the production is exported, often
through a family-based network.
Investor’s Farm Owned by Absentee-owners Not
Involved in Farm Management: Investment is
very high: $900,000 to 1 million for a farm of
33 Olive trees are grown, as farmers would not have enough water to irrigate their entire farm if it was fully planted with stone-fruit
trees. Moreover, owners are sentimentally tied to this traditional crop and it is a way to appropriate land in these desert areas. Olive
orchards have a low profitability: US$60/ha/yr when trees are young and US$550/ha/yr when they are mature (production is exported
through the owners’ own export channels).
about 40 to 80 hectares with two wells. Half of
the area is planted with low-benefit olive trees.
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As in family fruit-tree systems (adopted by
the settled Bedouins), peaches and nectarines
are the main trees planted in the entrepreneur’s
farm. However, entrepreneurs also grow plum,
apricot and apple trees, which are more costly to
produce and need closer management and more
labor, but yield attractive returns. Yields and
prices observed in these entrepreneurial farms
are higher than in family farms: they have
better-quality products and about 50 percent of
these products are exported to the Gulf
countries, Syria and Lebanon (against the 30%
in family farms). These entrepreneurial farms are
very profitable and per hectare net benefit
averages $16,000 and $14,850 in intensively
managed farms and absentee-investor’s farms,
respectively. The differences in profitability are
related to differences in management.
Absentee-owners: ‘Prestige’ Olive Tree or
Extensive Vegetables
Olive orchards are often developed in parallel to
other activities (vegetables, stone-fruit orchard),
mainly by settled Bedouins. However, a large
share of the total irrigated olive-tree area in the
highlands (7,000 to 7,500 ha) corresponds to what
can be called ‘prestige farms’. These farms have
a high social and prestige and, sometimes,
recreational value, but their conventional
economic profitability is very low, sometimes
even nil (Lavergne 1996; Fitch 2001; Venot
2004a). They may also include long-term
strategies of land occupation and the planted area
is maximized to correspond with the well
capacity; hence the low depths of water
application and frequent deficit irrigation (also
observed by Hanson 2000). Most of these farms
are found in the eastern desert zone.
Farms have an average area of 10 to 40
hectares. The owner rarely comes to the farm, and43
when he does it is only to supervise the harvest
period. All the work is done by permanent
employees (either Egyptian or low-income
Jordanian workers). The orchard is—with very few
exceptions— irrigated by drippers. Trees begin to
produce after 4 years; maturity is reached at
12 years and average yields of 4,500 kg/ha/yr can
be maintained for 50 years. Profitability is negative
for young trees (at $200/ha/yr) but reaches the
(still low) level of $300/ha/yr when trees are mature
(at current olive-oil and water prices).
A few absentee-owners/tenants living outside
the region (notably in Amman) can also have
extensive systems of open-field vegetables. They
are not directly involved in farm management,
hire a manager to take care of operations, and
have other sources of revenue. The cropping
patterns are similar to those in settled Bedouin
vegetable farms but the profitability of this
system is lower due to more extensive
management: $600/ha.
Farming Systems in the Jordan Valley
Family Farming Systems: Vegetables in Open
Fields
Land can be owned or rented. Landowners are
mostly Jordanian with their origin in the Jordan
Valley itself; and tenants can be Jordanian,
Palestinian, or even Pakistani. Field work is
entirely done by the family and, if necessary, with
the help of daily workers (in rare cases some
permanent workers can be found in the largest
farms). Farms have an area of 3 to 6 hectares.
Crops grown are very diverse and there are two
main cropping seasons (first seedlings are done in
October/November: Tashrini crops of squash,
onion, pepper, cabbage, cauliflower and eggplant,
etc.; the second crop is planted in January/
February: Khamsini crops as tomato, squash,
potato, pepper, etc.,). On-farm investments remain
limited; most farmers rent the land preparation
equipment and some of them own trucks to
transport their products. The average net income
of farmers is $3,800/ha/yr. Revenue fluctuations
are high, both temporally (from one year to
another) and spatially (revenues are higher in
systems developed in the north of the Jordan
Valley that are more intensively managed than
those in the south) and most of these open-field
family farmers are in precarious situations.
A few small entrepreneurs who cannot
invest in greenhouses also developed open-field
vegetable production, which provides relatively
high revenue. The benefit per hectare from
these entrepreneurial systems is slightly lower
than in the family systems, but it is not shared
among several family workers and is earned by
a single farmer.
Entrepreneurial Greenhouse Farms
Greenhouses allow the control of temperature and
humidity and so the production of vegetables in
winter (when prices are the highest). These
systems are, therefore, very profitable and the
net income averages $7,500/ha/yr. The main
crops are: tomato, cucumber, melon, hot and
sweet pepper, eggplant and bean. Greenhouse
farms are mainly located in the middle of the
Jordan Valley. Greenhouse production requires
higher investments and closer management than
open-field production. As such, farmers usually
use greenhouses for only a part of their farms,
depending on their investment capacity. Most of
the greenhouses are developed by medium
entrepreneurs in farms of 6 to 10 hectares. All
the work is done by permanent employees,
mostly Egyptian. The smaller entrepreneurs are
closely involved in the management of their
farms. Larger and richer entrepreneurs appoint a
manager with knowledge in agricultural
engineering. Greenhouses can be found in family
systems too. Farms are smaller and slightly less
profitable but still allow a net benefit per family
worker well above the poverty line (average of
about $15,000/yr).
Citrus Farms: Family and Prestige Farms
Citrus farms are located both in the north and in
the middle of the Jordan Valley. In the north,
colder and rainier climate, deeper and better soils,
and better water quality are suitable for the44
development of citrus orchards. Different species
of citrus are widespread in the Jordan Valley
(clementine, mandarin and various types of
oranges, lemon, pomelos, etc.,). In order to
minimize the risk linked to price fluctuation and to
enjoy an extended harvest period, farmers
diversify their cropping pattern. Most farmers are
owners of their plots (Ducros and Vallin 2001).
Farmers rent all the equipment needed for land
preparation and transport. Two main kinds of
farms, differing by their type of management, can
be identified:
Family Farms with an Area of 3 to 6 Hectares:
Management is relatively intensive (drip or open
tube irrigation, use of fertilizers, etc.,). Most of
the work is done by the family and there is often
one permanent employee. The net income
averages $1,250/ha/yr.
Prestige Farms Developed by Absentee-owners:
Farms have an area of 1 to 20 hectares and can
be divided into several noncontiguous plots.
On-farm investments are minimal, all the work
being done by a few permanent employees. There
is often a villa in the farm. For these urbanites,
the recreational, social and prestige value of the
orchard is more important than its low economic
value: the net income averages $400/ha/yr.
In general, the profitability of citrus
orchards is now very low; the more extensive
the management, the lower the expected
revenue. Citrus farming systems have been
highly affected by the changing conditions
faced by Jordanian agriculture (notably price
decrease and overproduction), but they had
been far more profitable during the 1980s and
early 1990s (GTZ 1995).
Banana Farms
Banana farms are located in the extreme north,
the extreme south of the Jordan Valley, and along
small side-wadis out of the JVA command area.
Generally, banana-farming systems are less
intensive (in terms of work input, fertilizer and
water use) in the north than in the south. Family
farms in the northern part have an area of 1 to 5
hectares, generally irrigated by drippers but
sometimes by furrow, and are entirely covered
with bananas. Half of the work is done by the
family, the other half by daily-paid or permanent
workers. Banana orchards require high initial
investments but they ensure lofty returns: the net
benefit averages $7,000/ha/yr in family systems
of the northern Jordan Valley.
Entrepreneurial banana farms can also be
found in the north and the south of the Jordan
Valley. In these systems, the owners are mainly
involved in farm management, while work is done
by permanent employees. Entrepreneurial farms
in the north often have an area of 1 to 5
hectares, which yield a net benefit of about
$12,500/ha/yr.
Banana is the most profitable—and the
more water-consuming—crop grown in Jordan.
This profitability, however, is partly due to
custom tariffs that make imported banana
costlier: banana producers are thus subsidized
by consumers.
Poor Farmers with Mixed Farms
This type of farming system is relatively rare in
the Jordan Valley. Farmers are mainly former
slaves of noble tribes, or Palestinian refugees of
1948 who live in the Jordan Valley. Most of the
time, farmers are tenants or sharecroppers
(generally on 1 to 3 ha at a maximum) but some
may have benefited from the land reform of 1962
and have become owners. The household also
diversifies its revenue with certain amount of
livestock activity (goats, sheep, and cows).
Farmers diversify their cropping pattern to
mitigate risks linked to the market and choose
low labor-intensive crops so as to face labor
peaks, during which time the family workforce
obtain work outside the farm to maximize the
household’s income. Initial and annual
investments are very low. The net revenue
reaches only about $1,050/ha/yr and does not
allow a household with no secondary revenue to
live above the poverty line.45
Appendix 2
Net Crop Water Requirement (in m3/ha/year) in the Amman-Zarqa
Basin (adapted from Fitch 2001)
Crop Mafraq region Zarqa River region Weighed average
(eastern desert area)
Tomato 7,500 6,130 7,010
Cauliflower and cabbage 5,000 3,840 4,580
Other vegetables 7,500 5,910 6,930
Watermelon 4,130 3,210 3,800
Sweet melon 5,810 4,580 5,360
Average on vegetables 5,990 4,730 5,540
Olive 6,880 6,880 6,880
Apple 10,620 9,750 10,310
Peach 10,040 9,230 9,750
Grape 10,430 8,220 9,630
Other stone-fruits 10,450 9,600 10,150
Other deciduous fruits 10,040 9,230 9,750
Average on orchards (olive excluded) 10,320 9,210 9,920
Notes: 1. The net requirement is the total crop requirement divided by an estimated 80 percent efficiency for drip irrigation in the
Amman-Zarqa Basin
2. The weighed average is obtained on the basis of the crop share in the two regions46
Appendix 3
Net Irrigated Areas (ha) in the Amman-Zarqa and the Yarmouk
Basins (top) and in the Northern and Middle Directorates of the
Jordan Valley (bottom)
Evaluation based on landuse analysis Amman-Zarqa Basin Yarmouk Basin
from MWI/GTZ data (see figure 1)
Total Belonging to the Total Belonging to the
eastern desert zone eastern desert zone
Vegetables 2,490 1,695 545 170
Olive trees 5,440 4,640 1,320 1,290
Other trees (mainly stone-fruits) 2,835 2,210 1,830 1,830
Total 10,765 8,545 3,695 3,290
Crops Autumn Summer Citrus and Bananas Cereals Total
vegetables vegetables other trees (essentially rain-fed)
Irrigated area (ha)* 5,210 3,130 8,060 285 2,660 19,345




Crop Water Requirement (in mm/day) as presented in the Baker
and Harza Study of 1955 and Originally Used to Calculate
Irrigation Quotas in the Jordan Valley (left panel—south of the
Jordan Valley; right panel—north of the Jordan Valley)—(Baker
and Harza 1955)
Vegetables Citrus Bananas
January 0.3 0.3 0.6
February 0.6 0.5 0.9
March 1.2 1.0 2.0
April 2.1 1.7 3.4
May 2.5 2.1 4.1
June 2.9 2.3 4.7
July 2.9 2.4 4.8
August 2.9 2.3 4.6
September 2.5 2.0 4.0
October 2.1 1.7 3.4
November 1.2 1.0 2.0
December 0.5 0.4 0.9
Vegetables Citrus Bananas
January 1.1 0.9 1.9
February 1.4 1.1 2.3
March 1.9 1.5 3.0
April 2.1 1.7 3.4
May 2.6 2.1 4.2
June 3.0 2.4 4.9
July 3.0 2.5 4.9
August 2.9 2.3 4.7
September 2.4 2.0 4.0
October 2.1 1.7 3.4
November 1.7 1.4 2.8
December 1.4 1.2 2.3
  Left panel Right panel48
Appendix 5
Current and Proposed Irrigation Water Tariff Structure in the
Jordan Valley (FORWARD 2000)
Water quality Usage block Irrigation tariff (per 1,000 m3)
(m3/month/3.5 ha maximum) Current Proposed
0–2,500 $11.5 (JD 8) $21.6 (JD 15)
Freshwater 2,501–3,500 $17.3 (JD 12) $43.2 (JD 30)
3,501–4,500 $28.8 (JD 20) $64.8 (JD 45)
Over 4,500 $50.4 (JD 35) $79.2 (JD 55)
Low-quality water 0–2,500 $11.5 (JD 8)
(freshwater mixed with 2,501–3,500 $17.3 (JD 12)
treated effluents or 3,501–4,500 $28.8 (JD 20)
highly saline water) Over 4,500 $50.4 (JD 35)
Appendix 6
Crop-wise Water Prices and Water Costs in the Jordan Valley
(Northern and Middle Directorates)
Vegetable farms Citrus farms Banana farms Weighed average*
Average water price per $0.013 $0.014 ($0.023) $0.018
cubic meter (JD 0.009) (JD 0.010) JD 0.016  (JD 0.013)
Total water costs per  $67  $138  $350  $303
hectare and per year (JD 47) (JD 97) (JD 245) (JD 212)
Note: * Evaluation based on irrigated areas in the northern and middle directorates as given in appendix 3




Example of Cropping Pattern and Water Requirement in a Vegetable
Farm in the middle of the Jordan Valley (Petitguyot 2003)5051
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